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Abstract 
 
Tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, known as the 3TG, are commonly used in electronics, and 
other high tech and manufactured products. Their extraction in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, where human rights and civil war are prevalent, means that many 3TG from the region 
have been categorised as “conflict minerals.” The Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI, now 
known as the Responsible Minerals Initiative), founded in 2008, now has over 350 original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) member companies. The industry group addresses conflict 
minerals and other risk issues in their supply chains. The CFSI runs the Conflict-Free Smelter 
Program (CFSP, now known as the Responsible Minerals Assurance Process), which defines 
standards and validates smelters and refiners as conflict free through third-party audits. A 
subgroup of the CFSI includes approximately fifty OEM members, constituting the Smelter 
Engagement Team (SET). The SET targets smelters and refineries deep upstream in the 
electronics supply chain. This sustainable supply chain management is characterized by both its 
business collaboration, as well as its focus deep into manufacturing supply chains. 
 
The research investigated mechanisms and effectiveness of deep supply-chain engagement of the 
SET and its member firms to connect with 3TG smelters and refiners. Specifically, the research 
addressed methods and frequency of engagement, barriers encountered (e.g. geographical and 
cultural), resources utilized, and allocation of responsibilities associated with efforts to 
encourage conflict-free compliance from smelters and refiners. This study employed a parallel 
convergent mixed methods approach to identify the external forces and internal tactics that allow 
corporations to engage deeply in their supply chains, beyond the visible horizon, to connect with 
upstream producers, and the practices through which OEMs work together to engage suppliers. 
First, data from the CFSI on 323 smelters and refiners were analysed to produce timelines 
describing forces and events from 2010 to 2017 regarding the participation of 3TG supplier 
companies in the CFSP. Second, six individuals from the SET were interviewed, and with 
reference to the timelines, were questioned regarding supplier engagement. An established 
framework (mostly recently revised by Sauer and Seuring, 2017) on sustainable supply chain 
management of minerals was used to frame the study and to structure coding and analysis of the 
interviews.  
 
Contributions of this research to scholarship include testing of the sustainable supply chain 
management framework, with suggested modifications to categories: Contextual dimensions 
(Liability of foreignness and Unique industry considerations), Supply-chain visibility and 
Sustainable pro-activity. The understanding of mechanisms of deep supply-chain engagement 
contributes to industry practice by, identifying successful supplier engagement practices and 
encouraging firms with similar motivations of sustainable supply chain management to consider 
responsible sourcing of minerals. Numerous tactics for deep supply-chain engagement were 
identified, including Targeted Outreach, Regionally Specific Engagement, Incentives, and Mass 
Outreach. 
 
Although the research was limited in the number of interviews, and limited in scope to conflict 
minerals used in the electronics industries, the generalizability of results to other industries is 
discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Conflict Minerals and the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative 
 
Conflict minerals, tin (Sn), tantalum (Ta), tungsten (W), and gold (Au), known as the 3TG 
minerals, are commonly used in manufactured products of the electronics, and information and 
communications technology (ICT) industries. The extraction and production of conflict minerals 
in Central Africa is especially prevalent in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
contributes to human rights abuses such as forced labour, sexual violence, and armed conflict. 
This illegal extraction and trade finances civil conflicts that have led to over 5.4 million deaths in 
the DRC since 1988 (Partnership Africa Canada, 2016).  
 
There have been several efforts to address the social issues associated with the 3TG mineral 
supply chains. Section 1502 of the US 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) included requirements for corporations listed on US stock 
markets to report on the sources of conflict minerals in their manufactured products. Another 
pertinent legislation effort is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Due Diligence Guidance (OECD Guidance), a “collaborative government-backed multi-
stakeholder initiative” (p. 3) by providing firms with a “due diligence framework for responsible 
supply chains of minerals… [and] a model mineral supply chain policy” (p. 16) among other 
detailed tools and recommendations to prevent further contributions to armed conflict and human 
rights violations (OECD, 2016). 
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Members of the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-Sustainability 
Initiative (GeSI) founded the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) to address conflict mineral 
issues in their supply chains. The CFSI, now known as the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) 
helps firms and their suppliers determine smelters and refiners that can be validated as conflict-
free though independent, third-party audits that are in line with current global standards, 
including the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD Guidance (RMI, 2018).  
 
This “non-state market driven” (Cashore et al., 2004, p. 4) initiative is “a novel mechanism of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and supply-chain sustainability management” (Young and 
Dias, 2012, p. 3) in the electronics and ICT industries and aligns with Yawar and Seuring’s 
(2015) suggestion that “successful management of social issues in supply chains… requires 
collaborative efforts and development strategies” (p.638). Via strategies such as formal 
protocols, third party audits, stakeholder collaboration, and an industry oversight group (Young 
and Dias, 2012), OEMs engage directly with smelters and refiners (SORs) upstream in their 
supply chain (i.e. they often skip over primary manufacturers). The CFSP considers SORs as 
“chokepoints” to trace and control conflict minerals in the supply chain (Young, 2015), as after 
minerals are refined, mixed, and added to alloys it is almost impossible to determine origin 
(Hoffman et al., 2015). 
 
Thus, there are three factors distinguishing the CFSI: 1) it is a business led collaboration, 2) it 
targets social issues deep in the supply chain (where firms take responsibility right at the source), 
and 3) it depends on firms voluntarily adopting a level of sustainable supply chain management 
beyond legal, and economic requirements 
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The included literature review (Chapter 2) will focus on the four main themes underlying the 
role, practices, and nature of the CFSI: sustainable supply chain management, business 
collaboration, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Conflict minerals often come from geographically diverse ore deposits, are usually mixed with 
minerals from different sources, and are commonly used as components of manufactured 
products; thus, they are difficult to trace (Hofmann et al., 2015). The extensively multi-tiered and 
shared mineral supply chain results in challenges in tracing resources through the supply chain. 
In 2014 and 2015 almost 80% of companies stated that they could not determine the origin of the 
3TG minerals used, as they are multiple levels between them and the mines and smelters (Kim 
and Davis, 2016).  Furthermore, if the minerals were sourced from the DRC, and the surrounding 
area, these companies could not determine if their purchase contributed to armed groups (Kim 
and Davis, 2016). Only 1% of firms definitively stated that their mineral resources were conflict 
free (Kim and Davis, 2016). Thus, conflict minerals are a systemic problem of supply chain 
management, rather than the responsibility of a single firm’s legal and compliance efforts 
(Hofmann et al., 2015). 
 
The study of conflict minerals becomes an area through which this research examines deep 
supply chain engagement in management scholarship at this new intersection of sustainable 
supply chain management, business collaboration, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory. 
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1.3 Significance and Contributions 
 
The exploitation of people and abuse of human rights through forced labour, sexual violence, and 
armed conflict in the extraction and manufacturing of conflict minerals is significant and worth 
investigating. By examining the effectiveness of business collaborations to engage in deep 
supply chain sustainability and understanding the success and challenges related to the 
mechanisms of deep supply chain engagement undertaken by the CFSI this research hopes to 
raise awareness of the conflict mineral industry. This research will contribute to the scholarship 
at the intersection of management, business collaboration, and sustainable supply chain 
management of minerals. Additionally, contributions to industry include determining the 
mechanisms of deep engagement that are most and least effective in addressing social issues. 
This has potential for improved sustainable supply chain management strategies in both mineral 
and non-mineral supply chains. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
What external forces and internal tactics allow the CFSI to engage deeply in supply chains, 
beyond the visible horizon? What are the mechanisms of deep supply chain engagement used by 
CFSI member OEMs to connect with upstream producers? How effective is it? How do OEMs 
work together to engage suppliers?  
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1.5 Definitions of Key Terms 
• 3TG – Tin, tantalum, tungsten, gold; conflict minerals 
• CFSI – Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative 
• CFSP – Conflict-Free Smelter Program 
• CoC – Chain of custody 
• Collaborative supply chain – “two or more independent companies work[ing] jointly to 
plan and execute supply chain operations with greater success than when acting in 
isolation” (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p.10) 
• Conflict mineral – material “whose systemic exploitation and trade contribute to human 
right violations in the country of extraction and surrounding areas” (Hofmann et al., 2015, 
p. 115) 
• CSR – Corporate social responsibility 
• Deep Supplier Engagement – when downstream firms communicate and build 
relationships with suppliers many tiers upstream, often beyond the visible horizon 
• EICC – Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition 
• GeSI – Global e-Sustainability Initiative 
• GSCM – Green Supply Chain Management 
• ICT – Information and Communications Technology  
• MNC – Multinational corporation 
• OECD – The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
• OEM – Original Equipment Manufacturer 
• Responsible Sourcing – an approach for life cycle management, where “downstream 
producers seek raw materials and manage upstream production processes to be more 
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sustainable” (Young, 2015, p. 4); includes tracking or tracing of life cycles (Young and 
Dias, 2012) 
• SET – Smelter Engagement Team 
• SOR – Smelter or Refiner 
• Supply chain due diligence (SCDD) – “the process through which enterprises can 
identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential 
adverse impacts as an integral part of business decision-making and risk management 
systems“ (OECD, 2011, p. 23) 
• Sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) – “the management of material, 
information and capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply 
chain” while incorporating the three pillars of sustainable development – economic, 
social, and environmental- as determined by their stakeholder demands (Seuring and 
Muller, 2008, p. 1700) 
• TBL – Triple Bottom Line 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to understand the academic literature that forms the 
foundation of sustainable supply chain management practices. The review seeks to explain the 
concepts influencing the formation of the CFSI, as well as the unique “deep supplier 
engagement” (Young, personal communication, 2017) practices the member firms employ. The 
literature review examines stakeholder theory, sustainable supply chain management theory, 
business collaboration theory, and institutional theory, as well as their applications to the 
management of conflict minerals. Through this literature review, a framework of sustainable 
mineral supply chain emerges, and is adopted as the theoretical framework grounding this 
research.  
 
2.2 Literature on Stakeholder, Sustainable Supply Chain Management, 
Business Collaboration, and Institutional Theories 
 
 2.2.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is often used to explain the implementation of green supply chain 
management (GSCM) (Sarkis et al., 2011). Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as groups or 
individuals who affect or are affected by the accomplishment of an organization’s goals. While 
there are multiple developments and applications of stakeholder theory, due to various 
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categorizations such as internal or external and primary or secondary, the consistent underlying 
principle is that stakeholders influence organizational operations by pressuring firms to 
internalize externalities in order to reduce negative impacts and increase positive impacts (Sarkis 
et al., 2011). Stakeholder theory is not only a description of relationships between a firm and its 
stakeholders; it has managerial implications as well (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  Stakeholder 
management exists upon the normative foundation of stakeholder theory and requires that firms 
should both recognize the legitimacies of diverse stakeholder interests and try to respond to them 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
 
As one group of important stakeholders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often hold 
firms accountable for environmental and social issues in their upstream supply chain, using 
reputational vulnerability as a pressure (Roberts, 2003). Pressures that firms face include “legal 
demand/regulation, response to stakeholders, competitive advantage, customer demands, 
reputation loss, and environmental and social pressure groups” as summarized by Seuring and 
Muller (2008, p. 1703). “Focal firms”, as discussed by Seuring and Muller (2008), are those that 
manage the supply chain, directly contact consumers, and control the product being sold. 
Consequently, a distinctive feature of supply chain management emerges: the pressure a focal 
firm faces is often transferred onto its suppliers, requiring the focal firm to examine the entire 
life-cycle of their product and take responsibility for more of their supply chain (Seuring and 
Muller, 2008). And, according to Silvestre (2015), focal firms are necessary for enhanced supply 
chain performance as they act as “change agents” and leaders within the supply chain, and have 
the potential to “specify supply chain policies to other members, and exercise control over the 
supply chain's decisions and activities” (p. 158). 
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Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo (2016) and Roberts (2003) agree that NGO activism is a primary 
driver in upstream corporate social responsibility (CSR) management, especially since the focus 
of upstream CSR has shifted from worker to human rights, from contract reasoning to social 
connections, and lastly, from a perspective of opposition to that of collaboration. Furthermore, 
the value of NGOs as key stakeholders is evident, as persistent pressure on MNCs results in 
some corporations beginning to adopt full producer upstream CSR by addressing conflict 
minerals at increased depths in their supply chain (Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo, 2016).  
 
Rotter et al. (2014) suggest that in order to manage problems – such as conflict minerals – 
characterized by globalization, deregulation, and crises, a political CSR approach is one method 
through which businesses are powerful stakeholders. Political CSR “suggests an extended model 
of governance with business firms contributing to global regulation and providing public good… 
[and] where private actors such as corporations and civil society organizations play an active role 
in the democratic regulation and control of market transactions” (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 
901). Rotter et al. (2014) add that political CSR expands a firm’s corporate conduct to include 
addressing issues such as (lack of) respect for human rights while still maximizing business 
value. 
 
Sarkis et al. (2011) identify future research opportunities in “internationally focused stakeholder 
theory” which has increased in relevance due to the globalization of supply chains and the 
expansion stakeholder’s “visible horizons” (the limit to which an agent is aware of the supply 
chain (Carter et al., 2015)), and, in turn, the depth to which firms take responsibility in their 
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supply chains. In light of this phenomenon, Sarkis et al., (2011) also suggests investigating the 
standardization of supply chains, such as environmental standard ISO 149001, as a market signal 
that firms and their suppliers within their supply chain operate with recognized management 
practices. 
 
When addressing the problem of conflict minerals, focal firms (Seuring and Muller, 2008), 
especially those within the electronics industry, are adopting responsibility for the entire supply 
chain by co-designing new self-regulations (Rotter et al., 2014). Despite the complexity of 
conflict mineral supply chains, and potential that a firm may or may not source conflict minerals, 
these focal firms have adopted a political CSR approach to work with other stakeholders – civil 
society actors, governments, and intergovernmental organizations – to collaboratively solve this 
issue (Rotter et al., 2014). Silvestre (2015) claims that in complex and uncertain business 
environments – such as the mining of conflict minerals – focal firms have an important role in 
“managing the escalating ambiguity, stimulating supply chain learning, and promoting 
innovation towards supply chains enhanced sustainability performance” (p. 156). 
 
In conflict mineral supply chains, the members of the CFSI are downstream stakeholders – or 
focal firms – that put pressure on their upstream suppliers to address social issues and participate 
in the CFSP. Furthermore, the CFSI allows competing stakeholders to build stronger capabilities 
for sustainable supply chain management of minerals by identifying their shared upstream 
stakeholders (i.e. mines, smelters, and refiners), creating new business collaborations between 
downstream OEMs and industry associations, focusing on international stakeholders, and driving 
agents to look deeper in their shared supply chains.  
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 2.2.2 Sustainability Supply Chain Management Theory 
According to Carter et al. (2015), the supply chain has six underlying characteristics: (1) the 
supply chain is a network consisting of nodes [agents] and links; (2) the supply chain is a 
complex adaptive system, where “each node in the supply chain has control over resources and 
accountability”(p. 90); (3) the supply chain is relative to agents, as “what the agent sees may 
vary depending on the type of raw materials and parts that it sources and deliver” (p. 91); (4) the 
supply chain has both physical and support components, that describe the movement of goods 
and finance and/or information respectively; (5) “the visible horizon of the focal agent” (p. 93) is 
the limit to which an OEM is aware of agents their supply chain; and (6) “the visible horizon of 
the focal agent is subject to attenuation, where distance is based on factors including physical 
distance, cultural distance, and closeness centrality” (p. 94).  
 
An agent is an actor in a supply chain that looks upstream (towards suppliers) and downstream 
(towards buyers), however, visibility in both directions is limited which, consequently, can create 
“blind spots” (Carter et al., 2015). Visibility, or lack thereof, is among the dominant factors 
impeding supply chain accountability and sustainability; other factors include organizational and 
supply chain complexity (Kim and Davis, 2016). Klassen and Vereecke (2012) add that there is a 
relationship between social issues and societal expectations that expands normatively, suggesting 
that in order for social management capabilities to be effective, they must be localized for 
stakeholders. Thus, it can be concluded that there is a relationship between a given supply 
chain’s visibility to stakeholders and subsequent pressures stakeholders place upon firms to take 
responsibility for social issues in their supply chain. Furthermore, in addressing the role of 
stakeholder pressure in driving CSR, Wolf (2014) promoted “proactive [SSCM] strategies” 
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which accept sustainability of resource supply as responsibility to an organization—regardless of 
stakeholder pressures. 
 
Seuring and Muller (2008) define sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) as “the 
management of material, information and capital flows as well as cooperation among companies 
along the supply chain” (p. 1700) while incorporating the three pillars of sustainable 
development – economic, social, and environmental – as determined by stakeholder demands.  
Similarly, Ahi and Searcy (2013) integrate business, sustainability, and supply chain 
management to define SSCM as a coordinated supply chain which voluntarily integrates 
economic, environmental, and social considerations where business systems are “designed to 
efficiently and effectively manage the material, information, and capital flows associated with 
the procurement, production, and distribution of products or services in order to meet stakeholder 
requirements and improve the profitability, competitiveness, and resilience of the organization 
over the short- and long-term.” (p. 339). 
 
Silvestre (2015) indicates that despite globalization as a supply chain trend, natural resource-
based supply chains are often more geographically bounded, due to limited locations of resource 
deposits, and are more susceptible to local social demands than other supply chains. 
Furthermore, supply chains in developing economies face unstable business environments and 
institutions, and higher degrees of complexities and uncertainties (Silvestre, 2015). 
 
Hoffman et al. (2015) offer the concept of “supply chain due diligence” (SCDD) as a mechanism 
by which to manage social issues associated with the extraction and trade of conflict minerals, as 
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SCDD incorporates all key actors into a chain of custody (CoC) that accounts for minerals from 
the mine through export and finally at the point of sale. This “responsible sourcing” is an 
approach used in life cycle management by which downstream firms sustainably manage both 
the extraction of raw materials and upstream manufacturing processes and have the potential to 
“provide substantial amounts of compliant materials to global markets, without a continuous 
connection along the product chain from raw material to end-products” (Young, 2015, p.2).  
 
Figure 1 depicts the multi-tiered and shared mineral supply chain, which creates a web of 
complexity. It portrays upstream producers (e.g., mines, mineral processors, regional 
transporters, and traders of minerals, smelters, refiners); midstream suppliers (e.g., global 
shippers, traders, and metal and chemical producers); and lastly, downstream OEMs (e.g., 
component and final product manufacturers, including brand-name OEM companies. The lack of 
a continuous connection in the conflict mineral supply chain is seen in the inability for 
downstream firms to trace their resources through multiple tiers of their supply chain (Kim and 
Davis, 2016). Thus, conflict minerals are a systemic problem of supply chain management, 
rather than the responsibility of a single firm’s legal and compliance efforts. 
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Figure 1 Multi-tier Mineral Supply Chain (based on CFSI, 2017) 
 
In order to manage this web of complexity, in sustainable supply chain management, smelters 
and refiners have been identified as “chokepoints” (Young et al., 2014). In practice, these 
chokepoints serve as an effective tool by which downstream OEMs can identify and engage with 
upstream suppliers (Young, 2015). Figure 2 (below) shows the positioning of smelters and 
refiners within the supply chain and as the identified target of the CFSP. 
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Figure 2 Smelters and Refiners as the Chokepoint in Mineral Supply Chains (source Young 
and Dias, 2012)  
  
When using the problem of conflict minerals to examine supply chain management, responsible 
and conflict free sourcing demonstrates the potential of compliance and supplier strategies to 
span multiple tiers of a supply chain in order to address social issues in developing countries 
(Young, 2015). Taka (2016) extends this by stating that the conflict minerals issue created a 
“shift in responsible supply chain management [by] … extending producer responsibility to 
respect human rights in the total supply chain through establishing traceability and transparency; 
and developing legally binding supply chain responsibility” (p. 37). Taka (2016) also suggests 
closed-pipe supply chain as a potential means to build stakeholder relationships and positively 
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affect socio-economic structures in the resource-based communities. Silvestre (2015) identifies a 
gap in theoretical and applied research in addressing the role focal firms take in driving supply 
chains towards sustainable activity, as well as on how and why there is variation (such as in pace 
of change) in the evolution of supply chain sustainability within different countries and 
industries.  
 
 2.2.3 Business Collaboration Theory 
Cao and Zhang (2011) identify a growing need for firms to look beyond their organization and 
“collaborate with partners to ensure that the supply chain is efficient and responsive to dynamic 
market needs” (p. 163). This collaborative supply chain is defined as “two or more independent 
companies work[ing] jointly to plan and execute supply chain operations with greater success 
than when acting in isolation” (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p. 10). According to 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2002), there are three common collaborative supply chain structures: 
vertical, horizontal and lateral. Vertical collaboration describes multiple firms physically related 
in the supply chain (such as manufacturers, distributors, retailers) sharing resources, expertise, 
and responsibility to meet the needs of similar end customers; horizontal collaboration describes 
the unrelated or competing firms; and lastly, lateral collaboration draws characteristics of both 
vertical and horizontal collaboration  (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Characteristics of a 
successful collaboration include explicit identification of strategic needs, forward looking 
planning and management, operations that meet goals, and an evaluation process (Simatupang 
and Sridharan, 2002). These elements are similar to the “Plan, Do, Check, Act” (PDCA) tool 
utilized by the International Organization for Standardization (2015). Lastly, Simatupang and 
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Sridharan (2002) conclude that collaborating supply chain members should align incentives, 
adopt appropriate and consistent performance measures, combine policies, and share expertise. 
There could also be a financial benefit to firms that participate in collaborations with those with 
similar goals and values. Cao and Zhang (2010) established that collaboration in the supply chain 
creates an advantage that allows members in the supply chain to improve performance. When 
looking at business collaborations through the lens of resource dependence theory, a normative 
observation arises where “in the supply chain, member firms should be dependent and 
collaborate to seek higher performance gains in the long-run instead of pursuing short-term 
benefits at the expense of others” (Sarkis et al., 2011, p. 8).  Resource dependence theory 
proposes that organizations are not completely self-sufficient but, rather, are dependent on 
resources from others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These shared dependencies form stakeholder 
relationships where competitive firms could participate in collaborative activities (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). A caveat of collaboration between competitive firms, however, is the 
promotion of self-interest at the expense of other members, and thus, it is necessary to establish 
management that works to align goals, practices, and benefits (Cao and Zhang, 2010). Duffy et 
al. (2013) states the need for fairness in collaborative supply chain relationships as actions of one 
stakeholder could influence the competitiveness of partnered stakeholders.  
 
Vachon and Klassen (2006) identified a positive relationship between the integration of supply 
chain members and green collaboration. Roberts (2003) believes effective ethical sourcing 
initiatives require, not only building a firm’s capacity to manage procurement in order to address 
environmental and social issues within the supply chain, but also participating in meaningful 
relationships with different “agents” (Carter et al., 2012) of the supply chain and with external 
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organizations. Additionally, an increase in a firm’s responsibility for social issues in their supply 
chain results in an increase in partnerships between those in the supply chain with similar 
attitudes regarding social issues (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012). This is seen in the recent 
development of upstream CSR and full producer responsibility as they incorporate wider 
practices such as human rights and environmental considerations, and socio-political 
complexities in all operations upstream in the supply chain (Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo, 
2016). This model of upstream CSR follows a political logic that results in collaborative and 
deliberative solutions where individual CSR initiatives are inferior to broad scale multi-
stakeholder and multi-industry initiatives and solutions (Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo, 2016). 
 
According to Rotter et al. (2014), in order to address conflict minerals and manage ethical 
sourcing in global supply chains, firms collaborate with other agents such as industry members, 
civil society actors and public authorities in a unique network. Their unique aim to “balance 
power and work toward a common goal… differs from traditional company negotiations” (Rotter 
et al., 2014, p. 595). Furthermore, the firms’ industrial and extensive stakeholder collaboration 
creates “self-imposed regulations” which reflect a moral stand in issues concerning conflict 
mineral production, create legitimacy with the goal of influencing other stakeholders, and work 
toward a conflict-free mineral trade market (Rotter et al., 2014). Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral 
(2012) add that “meta-standards as self-regulation mechanisms” act as “signalling models [of] 
social legitimacy” (p. 51) to stakeholders. Thus, the laterally collaborative CFSI, can be regarded 
as a form of self-regulation of conflict minerals by the electronics industry, where its meta-
standards (i.e. audits, certifications etc.) signal particular supplier characteristics that can lead to 
overall lower search and monitoring costs in the mineral supply chain (Heras-Saizarbitoria and 
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Boiral, 2012).  
 
In addressing conflict minerals in global supply chains, the OECD Guidance emphasizes 
collaborative approaches as tools to solve complex challenges (OECD, 2016). Members of the 
CFSI are often competitors in the ICT industry, yet, collaborate in pursuing sustainable supply 
chain management as their supply chains are shared networks with limited visibility into deep 
suppliers. The CFSI includes collaboration between firms to coordinate pooled financial 
resources, expertise, and SSCM strategies (Young, 2015).  Evidence of collaboration in the CFSI 
extends beyond the member firms, as “the CFSP has established agreements with other conflict-
free programs that run in parallel … [which] increase[s] the scope of coverage of compliant 
companies, strengthen awareness and interaction with smelters, and provide efficiencies in 
auditing processes” (Young, 2015, p. 14). Through combining resources and capabilities, 
members can take advantage of new profitable opportunities (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002) 
and jointly develop. 
 
 2.2.4 Institutional Theory 
According to Giunipero and Ketchen (2004), institutional theory suggests that firms make 
organizational choices and “emphasize certain supply chain practices because they observe other 
firms doing so” (p. 530) as a response to external pressures. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further 
argue that institutions within organizational fields (those that produce similar products or 
services or rely upon similar suppliers and resources) are pushed towards homogenization due to 
pressures, resulting in three types of isomorphism: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, 
and normative isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism is the result of authoritative “formal and 
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informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are 
dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 150).  These pressures could be force, persuasion, or invitations 
to collaborate. Additionally, coercive isomorphic change can be a response to legislation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Mimetic isomorphism results from management of uncertainty, as 
“when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, 
organizations may model themselves on other organizations” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 
150). Imitation based on mimetic behaviour is advantageous when organizations have to manage 
a problem with complex or ambiguous causes and solutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Lastly, normative isomorphism is a result of professionalization. The two main components of 
professionalization, that contribute to normative isomorphism are “the resting of formal 
education and of legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university specialists…[and] the 
growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which new 
models diffuse rapidly” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152).  
 
Campbell (2007) identifies a relationship between institutional theory, stakeholder theory, and 
corporate social responsibility, stating that firms are more likely to engage in socially 
responsibility behaviours, when they are part of industry associations and in dialogue with 
stakeholders. Additionally, Campbell (2007) explains that “strong state regulation, collective 
industrial self-regulation, NGOs and other independent organizations… and a normative 
institutional environment that encourages socially responsible behaviour” (p. 962) are other 
factors contributing to a firm’s decision to engage in socially responsible corporate behaviour. 
Sarkis and Zhu (2007) agree that normative and coercive pressures can lead to organizations 
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adopting better environmental practices, but depend on regulatory pressures, economic support, 
and the strategic championing of GSCM practices across the supply chain through market 
pressure. In contrast, Sarkis and Zhu (2007) argue that mimetic pressures do not require as much 
economic support to implement GSCM strategies, as participation in trade associations and 
benchmarking activities often leads to better economic returns.  Further, decisions, including 
SSCM strategies, founded on mimetic pressure are seen as wise when the proposed action is 
“viewed as highly legitimate and stakeholder support depends on the adoption of a legitimate 
action” (p. 54) as unconformity could lead to negative performance consequences (Giunipero 
and Ketchen, 2004).  
 
Applying institutional theory to the problem of conflict minerals presents the case for 
implementation of regulatory measures, such as legislation and self-regulation, as well as market 
pressures. Both downstream firms and upstream suppliers are more likely to adopt socially 
responsible strategies when faced with regulatory pressures (Sarkis and Zhu, 2007; Campbell, 
2007). In the ICT organizational field, supply chain agents are required to meet, or conform to, 
the requirements of the U.S. 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines. 
When using market pressure to drive the adoption of SSCM strategies, end-consumer demand is 
likely ineffective as they are unaware of and distant to supply chain practices (Giunipero and 
Ketchen, 2004; Fitzpatrick et al., 2014). Furthermore, in order to be effective at minimizing the 
contribution of mineral extraction and production to conflict, market pressure must come from 
multiple sectors, as the consumer electronics sector is only responsible for a small fraction of the 
total use of 3TG metals (Fitzpatrick et al., 2014). Through the CFSI’s program the CFSP, 
downstream member firms respond to legislative pressures by meeting the requirements of the 
		 22	
Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines, and upstream suppliers respond to 
multi-sector market pressures exerted by the CFSI and the industry associations it collaborates 
with (such as the LBMA, RJC, ITSCI). 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
Sauer and Seuring (2017) present a framework that identifies the key sustainable mineral supply 
chain management practices that fulfill the requirements of sustainability and thus contribute to 
business performance. They group these practices into six categories (orientation, government 
interventions, collaboration, continuity, risk management, and pro-activity) and then within three 
hierarchies (strategic values, structure, and processes). While the authors suggest this framework 
can practically guide professionals in implementing sustainable supply chain management, 
limitations of this framework include a lack of empirical testing (Sauer and Seuring, 2017). This 
framework is presented in Figure 3 and explained in further detail in Table 1. 
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Figure 3 Framework of sustainable supply chain management of minerals (from Sauer and 
Seuring, 2017, p. 238)  
Government interventions 
•  Direct regulation 
•  Interactive regulation 
•  Facilitating self-regulation 
•  Gov. as active consumer 
Collaboration 
•  Enhanced communication 
•  Technological integration 
•  Logistical integration 
•  Joint development 
Orientation 
•  TBL 
•  SCM 
Continuity 
•  SC  partner development 
•  Long-term relationships 
•  SC partner selection 
Risk Management 
•  Standards and certification 
•  Selective monitoring 
•  Pressure groups 
•  Primary supply stability 
•  Governance gaps 
Pro-activity management 
•  Stakeholder management 
•  Learning 
•  Innovation 
•  Environmental pro-activity 
•  Linkage development 
Strategic 
values 
SC structure 
SSCM processes 
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Table 1 Category and Related Practices Overview (from Sauer and Seuring, 2017, p. 238) 
Categories & Related Practices Description 
*Government interventions 
1) Direct regulation 
2) Interactive regulation 
3) Facilitating self-regulation 
4) Government as active 
consumer 
Governments intervene in SC governance and operations 
by imposing legally binding direct regulations, interacting 
with and financing social society actors, and providing 
information and guidance to facilitate self-regulation. In 
addition, they can act as active consumers to build markets 
for more sustainable products and services.  
Orientation 
5) Dedication to TBL 
6) Dedication to SCM 
Orientation centers on the strategic decisions of SC 
members to adopt the TBL and SCM practices to realize 
competitive advantages.  
Continuity 
7) SC partner development 
8) Long-term relationships 
9) SC partner selection 
Continuity draws on the SC structure and focuses on 
building long-term relationships with selected SC partners. 
Subsequent development of weak partners enhances overall 
SC performance.  
Collaboration 
10)   Enhanced communication 
11)   Technological integration 
12)   Logistical integrations 
13)   Joint development 
Operational practices, such as enhanced communication 
and joint development, strengthen the collaboration among 
SC members, which is further facilitated by integrating 
logistical and technological structures.  
Risk Management 
14)  Standards and certification 
15)  Selective monitoring 
16)  Pressure groups 
17)  *Primary supply stability 
18)  *Governance gaps 
Pressure groups targeting unsustainable operations in the 
SC represent major SC risks, which can be mitigated by 
monitoring suppliers and relying on standards and 
certification. Mineral SCs have to develop governance 
structures, since they often include weak governance 
contexts. In addition, it is important to stabilize primary 
mineral supplies, which have recently been subjected to 
substantial volatility and represent a supply risk.  
Pro-activity management 
19)  Stakeholder management 
20)  Learning 
21)  Innovation 
22)  *Environmental pro-activity 
23)  *Linkage development 
Being pro-active in mineral SCs starts with developing 
linkages at the mine to share revenues with often-exploited 
local stakeholders. Managing stakeholder requirements 
enables learning effects, which stimulate SC innovation. 
Environmental pro-activity represents a further means to 
diversify from competitors and gain competitive 
advantages in mineral SCs.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in the research and analysis. The objective of the 
study was to construct timelines of smelter participation and analyze the external forces and 
internal Smelter Engagement Team (SET) tactics that enabled or impeded smelter or refiner 
(SOR) participation in the CFSP. A convergent parallel mixed methods approach was adopted in 
order to answer the primary research question, What external forces and internal tactics allow 
the CFSI and SETs to engage deeply in supply chains, beyond the visible horizon?. 
 
The first stage of the research design involved investigating the engagement patterns of the 
smelters and refiners that participated in the CFSP. Descriptive data on smelters and refiners 
were sourced from the CFSI Smelter Database, a private database, made available by the CFSI. 
Details related to the smelters and refiners participating in the program such as active dates, site 
visit details, and outreach efforts on behalf of the CFSI to engage smelters in the CFSP, were 
explored. The data including the characteristics of the firms participating in the program were 
exported from the CFSI database into Microsoft Excel. These data revealed the number of days it 
took for a firm to become engaged in the CFSP. 
 
The qualitative research design involved conducting semi-structured interviews in order to 
complement the analysis and interpretation of the data from the CFSI. Key informants included 
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current and former SET members, who are experts in conflict minerals, the electronics industry, 
and deep supplier engagement through their role in the CFSI. 
 
3.2 Framework of Analysis 
 
This research adopts Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) framework for sustainable supply chain 
management of minerals. This framework was selected due to both its roots in broad sustainable 
supply chain management scholarship (Beske and Seuring, 2014) and its focus on the minerals 
sector. This framework also encompasses important themes of stakeholder theory, supply chain 
management, and business collaboration, for example, in its Pro-activity management, 
Orientation, and Collaboration categories, allowing for a systematic foundation for this research. 
Many of the elements in the framework, such as Collaboration, Self-regulation, Long-term 
relationships, Learning and Selective monitoring appear to be characteristic of the CFSI and its 
practices. Using this framework enabled, both, a structured dialogue with interview participants 
to identify which mineral sustainable supply chain management mechanisms they value, 
implement, and are challenged by, as well as, a guided framework to conduct deductive and 
inductive content analysis. 
 
3.3 Research Design 
 
A mixed methods research design was used for this study. According to Creswell (2014), a 
mixed methods research design combines qualitative and quantitative research and data in a 
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study. A mixed methods research design addresses the weaknesses of each method, as qualitative 
data can be open-ended, while quantitative data can be closed-ended (Creswell, 2014), and also 
“draw[s] upon the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches” (Fetters, Curry, and 
Creswell, 2013, p. 2135). 
 
This study employed a convergent mixed methods design. This approach involved concurrent 
collection of qualitative and descriptive data (Fetters et al., 2013).  More specifically, this 
research employed a parallel convergent mixed method, where “qualitative and quantitative data 
collection occurs in parallel and analysis for integration begins well after the data collection 
process has proceeded or has been completed. Frequently, the two forms of data are analyzed 
separately and then merged” (Fetters et al., 2013, p. 2137).   
 
The descriptive data was sourced from the CFSI Smelter Database, while the qualitative data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with current and former CFSI SET members. The 
purpose of both approaches was to examine the external forces and internal CFSI/SET tactics 
that motivate corporations to engage deeply in their supply chains, beyond the visible horizons. 
The two forms of data were collected separately and then merged in order to produce one 
“narrative” that details the external forces and internal tactics that contributed to smelter 
participation in the CFSP.  
 
The mixed method research design offered this study the best approach to evaluate the 
descriptive data with added qualitative context in order to produce detailed results that accurately 
represented the forces and tactics that factored into smelter and refiner participation in the CFSI. 
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A parallel convergent design was chosen as this design seeks to compare the descriptive and 
qualitative results through merging the two data sets. A merging method of integration was 
chosen, where merging takes place after the descriptive data was analysed and the textual data 
was qualitatively analyzed (Fetters et al., 2013).  This integration was done through “joint 
displays” where the data was integrated “by bringing the data together through a visual means to 
draw out new insights beyond the information gained from the separate quantitative and 
qualitative results… [by] organizing related data in a figure, table, matrix, or graph” (Fetters et 
al., 2013, p. 2143). As a visual “narrative” could be presented that allowed for the timeline data 
to be contextualized by qualitative data, the joint display parallel convergent mixed methods 
design offered this study the most comprehensive data collection and analysis processes.  
 
3.4 Timeline Data and Analysis 
 
Descriptive data of the CFSI database (privately available and provided by the CFSI) explored 
the details related to the OEMs, smelters, and refiners participating in the program, site visit 
details, and outreach efforts on behalf of the CFSI to engage smelters in the CFSP. Smelters and 
refiners who are participating in the CFSP do so on a voluntary basis and knowingly provide 
their data for inclusion in the CFSI’s database. All identifying information linking data to OEMs, 
smelters, or refiners was removed to preserve the anonymity of the OEMs, smelters and refiners, 
and the individual interviewees. 
 
Data describing all active participating SORs (n=323) were exported from the CFSI database 
into Microsoft Excel. The data points were mapped through time by active date in six-month 
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increments (i.e., the category 2010.2 describes the smelters that became active in the second half 
of the year 2010), and follows Na’s (2016) design. The characteristics of the SORs in the 
program were then analyzed, through the creation of pivot tables. These data were represented in 
two units: first, timelines of when smelters or refiners became active in the CSFP, and second, 
timelines comparing the percentage of active SORs that were participating in the CFSP to the 
total number of identified SORs. One timeline graph was produced for each of the four metal 
industries (tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold) and one aggregated timeline was produced to 
represent all 3TG metals smelters and refiners. A summary of the 323 smelters and refiners is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Summary of SORs in Research Sample 
 Tin Tantalum Tungsten Gold 3TG 
N 83 44 46 150 323 
Active SORs 
(as of 2017) 78 44 44 114 280 
Inactive SORs 
(as of 2017) 5 0 2 36 43 
 
3.5 Qualitative Research Design 
 
Interviews were conducted to contextualize the results drawn from the timeline analysis and to 
identify nuances and challenges in the deep supplier engagement that allowed the SORs listed in 
the CFSP database to actively participate in the program. 
 
3.5.1 Interviewees 
Potential interviewees were recruited for this study through a combination of convenience 
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sampling and purposive sampling. Convenience sampling is the “selection of the most accessible 
subjects” (Marshall, 1996, p. 523). Purposive sample is the selection of “the most productive 
sample to answer the research question” (Marshall, 1996, p. 523), where “subjects are selected 
based on study purpose with the expectation that each participant will provide unique and rich 
information of value to the study” (Etikan, Musa, and Alkassim, 2015, p. 4). Etikan et al. (2015) 
states that “both convenience sampling and purposive sampling share some limitations which 
include non-random selection of participants, that is to say the researcher is subjective and bias 
in choosing the subjects of the study” (p. 4).  
 
The interviewees were SET members recommended by CFSI. These contacts are industry 
experts in the fields of conflict minerals, and supplier engagement. Furthermore, they are, or 
were at some point, members of the CFSI and key members of one or more SETs. As such, these 
individuals were qualified candidates, with years of experience, and the potential to offer 
detailed expertise on the research topic. The interviewees approached include a cross-section of 
SET members with experience and knowledge in different regions and across different 3TG 
industries. They were individuals who were significant members in the SETs for several years. In 
total, 12 candidates were invited to participate in the study, resulting in six interviews being 
conducted.  
 
The candidates were invited by email. In all 12 cases, the CFSI contacted them directly, with the 
information letter and consent letter (approved by the University of Waterloo’s Office of 
Research Ethics), which offered a detailed description of the research purpose and study, design, 
and invited the candidate to participate in a 60 minute semi-structured interview over Skype or 
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by telephone. After a candidate responded expressing interest in participating, a follow up direct 
email was sent to schedule the interview at a convenient time and over the interviewee’s 
preferred communication method. After confirmation, the results of the descriptive data analysis 
– timelines of when smelters became active in the CSFP – were shared with the candidates. 
Interview questions were themed around these timelines.  
 
Interviewees reviewed and provided signed consent forms, which assured confidentiality and 
anonymity of their participation in the study, as well as consent to audio recording of the 
interview. The interviewees were also informed of their legal rights to withdraw from the study 
at any time. 
 
3.5.2 Interview Procedure 
The main purpose of this research was to evaluate the external forces and internal CFSI/SET 
tactics allow the CFSI and SETs to engage deeply in supply chains, beyond the visible horizon. 
Through mapping the timelines of when smelters and refiners became active in the CFSP, peaks 
and valleys of SOR participation were identified. Contextualizing these findings, and developing 
a nuanced understanding of how engagement tactics and influential factors contributed to smelter 
and refiner participation in the CFSP, required industry expertise and detailed knowledge of the 
CFSP, the SETs, and conflict minerals.  
 
Thus, semi-structured interviews were selected, in order to contextualize and clarify the timelines 
while still allowing the interviewees to speak to their personal experiences and nuanced 
perspectives. Semi-structured interviews were determined to be the most appropriate qualitative 
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data collection method, as they enable the researcher to explore the interviewees’ own 
perspectives, point of view and emphasize the concepts or phenomena that the interviewee 
believes to be relevant and important (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Semi-structured interviews also 
allowed the researcher the freedom to ask follow up questions in order to gather detailed and 
comprehensive answers (Bryman and Bell, 2015). “As a result, qualitative interviewing tends to 
be flexible… responding to the direction in which interviewees take the interview and perhaps 
adjusting the emphases in the research as a result of significant issues that emerge in the course 
of interviews” (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p. 481). Semi-structured interviews allowed for guided 
inquiry into the patterns of external factors and internal tactics identified in the timelines, while 
allowing for flexible exploration of each interviewees’ perspective of the important themes, 
outreach patterns, and challenges associated with deep supplier engagement. The University of 
Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics approved the interview questions, methods, and research 
proposal under ORE# 22601. The interview questions, found in Appendix A, inquired about the 
timelines in order to contextualize these findings. The order and context of the questions varied 
depending upon the interview. 
 
A total of six interviews were conducted between January and March of 2018. Five interviews 
were conducted over telephone, and one interview was conducted over a dial in conference call 
system. The length of the interviews ranged between 30 and 60 minutes. Three of the six 
interviews were recorded and manually transcribed post-interview. Those that were not recorded 
(due to interviewee consent) were captured by detailed researcher notes taken during the 
interview, and edited for clarity post-interview.  
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3.5.3 Interview Analysis 
The interview transcripts were imported into NVivo, a data analysis software, where they were 
analyzed and coded against Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) framework of sustainable supply chain 
management of minerals (Figure 3). This served to evaluate the CFSI and the SET’s deep 
supplier engagement and sustainable supply chain management tactics through the lens of the 
framework, in order to empirically test the framework to reinforce its themes or identify gaps in 
it. The content analysis methodology used was “a balance of deductive coding (derived from the 
philosophical framework) and inductive coding (themes emerging from participant’s 
discussions)” (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 91).  
 
The interviews were deductively coded to the appropriate practice or practices and then 
aggregated to the corresponding category or categories. This allowed references to be coded to 
all relevant categories and practices, and allowed for context to be maintained. Additional 
“Other” practices were added under each category, and a new “Other” category was created to 
allow themes not found in the existing framework to be coded appropriately. Inductive analysis 
of the references in the “Other” practices and category was conducted to identify common 
themes. These themes were then labelled as practices and grouped under the appropriate 
category. A new category was created when new practices were identified that did not fit within 
the existing the framework. 
 
Coding of units was based on sampling units that depended upon the researcher to determine the 
unit that has meaning and can vary between words, sentences, or paragraphs (Stemler, 2001). 
After codes were assigned to each sampling unit, a summary of the code frequency was 
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determined and further analyzed. This followed the assumption that “quantification of data in 
content analysis [can be done]…by measuring the frequency of different categories and themes, 
which cautiously may stand as a proxy for significance” (Vaismoradi, Turunen, and Bondas, 
2013, p. 404).  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
4.1 Timeline Analysis 
 
The descriptive data were mapped onto timelines in order to identify trends in the smelter active 
dates. This study presents the timelines displaying when 3TG SORs became active members of 
the CFSP. 3TG metals as a group were analysed, followed by individual metal group. Pivot 
tables in Microsoft Excel were used to sort data by active date and metal group. The resulting 
timelines are graphs generated in Microsoft Excel. The timelines show peaks and valleys in 
SORs achieving active status and were used to guide the qualitative data collection. These 
timelines can be found in Appendix B. 
 
4.2 Qualitative Results: Influences on SOR Participation in the CFSP 
 
The results from the qualitative data collection and analysis are presented in this section. The 
purpose of the qualitative data analysis was to contextualize the peaks and valleys in the smelter 
active dates. The results were contextualized timelines with added qualitative context from the 
semi-structured qualitative interviews.  The qualitative data was overlaid on these timelines in 
order to show important events that the interviewees identified as drivers or inhibitors of smelter 
participation in the CFSP. 
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3TG metals as a group were not analyzed in the interviews, as none of the interviewees presented 
information on 3TG metals as a whole, but rather spoke to their individual area of expertise. 
Accordingly, the individual analysis of each metal group is presented (Figures 4-7). The overlaid 
factors included identification of important events, external factors, or internal tactics that 
contributed to participation. The locations of the labels were an approximation of when the event 
or contributing factor occurred.  
 
4.2.1 Influences on Tin SOR Participation  
 
Figure 4 Influences on Tin Smelter or Refiner Participation in the CFSP. Overlaid boxes 
describe important events, external factors (white), or internal tactics (grey) that interviewees 
identified as contributing to SOR participation. 
 
As seen in Figure 4, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act was not a driving factor in motivating tin smelters 
or refiners from participating in the CFSP. This was explained by the low quantity of tin being 
sourced from the DRC, or covered countries. According to Interviewee 4, the majority of tin 
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smelters were not sourcing from the covered countries; therefore there was no urgency to 
participating in the CFSP. Interviewee 2 confirmed that since the majority of tin is sourced from 
Indonesia, this posed a challenge to get SORs to join a program that determines if they source 
from Central Africa. As Indonesia is a tin island, it did not make sense for Indonesian tin SORs 
to source from anywhere other than Indonesia (Interviewee 2). Additionally the CFSP faced 
some resistance from ITSCI (the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative, an industry association) – as 
Interviewee 4 explained, “the graph kind of indicates that [resistance], as far as early adopters, 
and the slowness given the number of tin smelters that exist. A lot of pushback from Indonesian 
tin smelters, a lot of pushback from [ITRI] members, and that made it a little bit slower.” 	
 
Another factor inhibiting the participation of tin smelters, identified by Interviewee 6, was the 
existence of a tax law that created financial barriers and export challenges, which in turn created 
reluctance to participate in the CFSP:  
“…we ran into the problem that the Vietnamese government has kind of like tax 
incentives for tin and tin production that weren't removed. So it was kind of like a tax 
reimbursement I think that they used for exporters of tin and a couple of years ago, they 
removed it so there's like 10 percent that refiners weren't getting back anymore and so 
that caused the smelters to stop exporting tin and just selling it to the local market. And 
so, once that happened, they were like we don't need [a CFSP] audit anymore because 
number one, we aren't exporting so it's not going to go into your supply chain and 
number two, this tax thing is really hurting our profitability and we can't be paying for an 
audit and worrying about an audit when we have this bigger problem…” 
 
Interviewee 3 also identified that some local government policies inhibited SOR participation:  
“There were some government policies and practices that mostly in the developing 
countries that kind of I would say... for example, called being conflict free would become 
more of a secondary factor for the smelters, because they were more into getting their 
licenses in place, their export licenses, which were changing every year…They would 
become more focused on their day to day production, dealing with government agencies, 
working on their taxes, the increase in taxes, so at times, these factors prevented, or 
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impeded them from driving from their goal of becoming conflict free or taking the CFSI 
program.” 
 
However, government regulations in Indonesia were able to contribute to tin smelters becoming 
active participants in the CFSP, through active collaboration and engagement between the CFSP 
and the ICDX (Indonesia Trade Derivatives Exchange). Interviewee 6 explained that the CFSI 
successfully collaborated with the ICDX and that now, “the ICDX made it a [legal] requirement 
for smelters to be [CFSP] compliant in order to be able to export tin from Indonesia”.  
 
Additionally, the creation of the SETs and their engagement tactics was instrumental in enabling 
tin smelters and refiners to participate in the CFSP. Interviewee 1 identified that the peaks in new 
participation in 2014 (Figure 4) correspond to an increase in site visits at this time. Interviewee 6 
confirmed that, in addition to site visits, financial incentives (through the Initial Audit Fund) 
played a key role. Furthermore, the decrease in new participants joining the CFSP can be 
attributed to 99% smelter or refiner participation (as seen in Figure 4), which Interviewee 6 
confirmed: 
“The initial peaks [in 2013-2015] are caused by that outreach and basically going out 
there and offering a free audit and helping them but then it became even more constant 
because of that local law from the ICDX and the ministry of trade in Indonesia. And then 
the valleys…I’m not a hundred percent sure, but I think at least 99% of smelters in 
Indonesia that we know of are compliant and participating in the program.” 
 
Interviewee 3 also spoke to the effectiveness of site visits: 
“… tin smelters started getting active, when we as member companies started visiting 
smelters for the program... I think the SET team played a major role, face-to-face 
contact. Creating local SET teams also helped, because only the US and Canada initially, 
could not do the outreach that the local SET team is doing now. Breaching language, 
breaching communication or going to those places physically.” 
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Additionally, Interviewee 6 stressed the importance of cultural considerations underlying the 
effectiveness of site visits, when compared to tactics such as emails and phone calls. 
 
In summary, participation of tin smelters and refiners in the CFSP was enabled by collaboration 
with local governments and the SET (and their financial incentives and site visits). Participation 
was impeded by tin sourcing practices, industry resistance, local tax laws (which led to financial 
and export barriers), and language and cultural barriers. 
 
4.2.2 Influences on Tantalum SOR Participation  
 
Figure 5 Influences on Tantalum Smelter or Refiner Participation in the CFSP. Overlaid 
boxes describe important events, external factors (white), or internal tactics (grey) that interviews 
identified contributing to SOR participation. 
 
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act was a driver for the increase in tantalum smelters and refiners 
becoming active participants in the CFSP. Interviewee 1 spoke to the influence of the electronics 
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industry in exerting market pressure to convince smelters and refiners to participate in the CFSP. 
Interviewee 4 elaborated that in the tantalum space, the electronics industry 
“ had the leveraging …[to] apply the pressure that we could… once we had, there were a 
couple other smelters that were under pressure that came into line very quickly, and 
that's why if you look at the second half of 2010, you see a big jump in the tantalum 
smelter participants, and so that got the ball rolling… And so with tantalum you see 
continued growth…I don't know who the final ones were but they finally had enough 
pressure to come on. But that's why you had such a high level participation early on with 
the tantalum, because the [downstream electronics] industry that was driving the 
initiative had a power to and the leverage and the purchasing power to influence that.” 
 
Interviewee 4 also identified that engagement and outreach efforts to work with stakeholders and 
pressure groups contributed to enabling tantalum smelters and refiners to participate. These 
stakeholders initially included electronics industry members, but expanded to include civil 
society members, global witnesses and governments. Additionally, Interviewee 4 stated that 
there was an April 1, 2011 deadline, after which all suppliers sourcing outside of OECD 
compliance schemes would not be listed as conflict-free.  
 
There were, however, a number of barriers that inhibited tantalum smelters and refiners from 
participating in the CFSP. Interviewee 4 identified these factors: 
“Concerns - cost- concerns with regard [to] business confidential information, the origin 
of their minerals, lack of awareness, not realizing that even though they're not in the US, 
Dodd-Frank does impact them…and then some that were sourcing from the Congo and 
couldn't pass. Because it was obvious that things were leaving the Congo still, that 
weren't either validated or being smuggled. And/or there wasn't the pressure from supply 
chain, depending on where they were located, who their customer base was, they might 
not have had pressures…” 
 
However, despite these barriers, both Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 5 stated that tantalum was 
the metal group where downstream market pressure resulted in 100% participation of the 
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upstream smelters and refiners and thus achieved the highest CFSP participation rate across the 
3TG industries.  
 
4.2.3 Influences on Tungsten SOR Participation 
 
Figure 6 Influences on Tungsten Smelter or Refiner Participation in the CFSP. Overlaid 
boxes describe important events, external factors (white), or internal tactics (grey) that interviews 
identified contributing to SOR participation. 
 
Figure 6 shows that the tungsten smelters or refiners took longer to become active participants in 
the CFSP compared to those in other 3TG industries. According to Interviewee 4, the initial lag 
in participation was due to the electronics industry having little to no leverage in the tungsten 
market. The increase in participation, according to Interviewee 4, did not occur until 2013, which 
corresponds to when the SET was created and was able to exert concerted pressure. Interviewee 
4 noted that, “tungsten was really late to the table and such a small amount of tungsten actually 
came out of the region, they just didn't really want to engage” and that it was the SET tactic of 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
# 
of
 S
m
el
te
rs
 
6 Month Increments 
SET created 
electronics industry had 
no leverage 
TI-CMC and CFSI 
collaboration 
		 42	
financial incentives (the CFSI funding of the Initial Audit Fund, which paid for tungsten SOR 
first audits) and collaboration with the tungsten industry association (TI-CMC) which enabled 
the CFSI to overcome these impediments. Interviewee 2 also agreed that gaining help from the 
tungsten industry association was essential. Interviewee 1 elaborated that the tungsten 
association negotiated a three year time period between audits, thus requiring tungsten SORs a 
longer audit validity period than for other 3TG industries. This overcame another financial 
barrier impeding tungsten SORs from participating in the CFSP.  
 
In summary, participation of tungsten smelters and refiners in the CFSP was enabled by CFSI 
collaboration with the tungsten association and the SET (through financial incentives). 
Participation was impeded by initial financial concerns, tungsten sourcing practices, and lack of 
leveraging power by the electronics industry resistance. 
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4.2.4 Influences on Gold SOR Participation 
 
Figure 7 Influences on Gold Refiner Participation in the CFSP. Overlaid boxes describe 
important events, external factors (white), or internal tactics (grey) that interviews identified 
contributing to SOR participation. 
 
Figure 7 shows the influences on gold refiner participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 5 stated that 
the increase in participants in 2014 is due to the introduction of the SEC reporting requirements, 
where downstream OEMs began collecting information on and reporting their sourcing practices 
to the CFSI. Interviewee 1 explained that among the 3TG metals, gold SORs were the most 
challenging to engage, and where SET tactics were the least successful. Interviewee 1 elaborated 
that these challenges are, in part, due to numerous non-industrial uses for gold, such as in 
jewellery and bullion, which account for about 80% of gold use.  Interviewee 3 echoed this, 
stating that, “gold refiners are mostly in jewellery which is not in electronics.  Electronics like 
our companies form a very low percentage. [The electronics industry] driving it was initially not 
as effective, because they kind of felt because they could pass away with [the CFSP] even if we 
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didn't do business with them”. Interviewee 6 agreed and added that “gold is a completely 
different animal” as there is not “that much gold in the electronics industry” and “the electronics 
and electronics industry associations don't have that much leverage with gold”. Additionally, 
Interviewee 6 identified gold as being a “harder metal to tackle” as it “can be recycled and [is] 
typically recycled and it's really hard to track and the quantities are much smaller for bigger 
profit…[and it is] such a big part of jewellery people aren't totally clear or aren't aware of the 
issues”. Furthermore, Interviewee 5 spoke about difficulty in upstream supply chain 
management, adding that many SORs do not realise it is a supply chain all the way down to the 
raw material and that it is new that downstream companies are becoming more responsible for 
the entire supply chain. Interviewee 3 also confirmed that there is low supply chain visibility in 
the gold industry: 
“It is very difficult to track the source of the gold, the chain of custody. It is a precious 
metal and can be smuggling and can be caught in small quantities. However, I think gold 
refiners and smelters are getting into place now, they are understanding why they need 
the chain of custody so hopefully we see more of these refiners getting into this 
program.” 
 
The Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) was identified as a key barrier to gold refiner participation 
in the CFSP. Interviewee 1 identified that in China, gold is sold and traded by banks, and as 
such, suppliers only identify the banks as their customer, and not the downstream OEMs asking 
for these audits. Interviewee 4 reinforced that the SGE plays a role in decreasing upstream 
supply chain visibility. Additionally, according to Interviewee 1, the SGE is not active in due 
diligence. Interviewee 2 echoed this, adding that as long as smelters in China abide by SGE 
policies, anything outside those rules is seen as unnecessary. Furthermore, there is added 
difficulty in convincing refiners that source gold from mines in China to join an (American) 
program that determines whether they source from Africa.  
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Interviewee 4 identified that another barrier impeding gold refiners from participating in the 
CFSP, is local government efforts to create legal trading channels: 
“In the gold space, illegal gold is worth more than legal gold, and there's a number of 
reason for that, one, they're not paying the taxes on it, so miners actually get more per 
gram of gold through illegal channels than they do through legal channels… its also used 
as currency, its used to wash money, so there's a higher value for the illegal stuff. So 
that's another challenge on the ground that gold has and that's why there’s very little 
artisanal gold going to any of the compliant smelters, if any.” 
 
The interviewees also identified that there were a number of factors that helped facilitate the 
participation of gold refiners in the CFSP. Interviewee 6 explained that in order to build supply 
chain visibility and identify gold refiners the SET employs a “two fold approach” of supplier 
engagement, followed by smelter engagement: 
“The first way we do it is through a supplier engagement. So [OEMs] conduct a supplier 
survey every year, we ask them to tell us what smelters are contributing to their 
products...So when they report those smelters, we ask them to engage with their supply 
chain so that they can convince people to join the program. This… can be a bit tricky 
because we are so far removed from the smelter itself and even our direct suppliers are 
removed from the smelter itself so that can be challenging twisting through the supply 
chain. So the second way is through the smelter engagement. After we conduct the survey 
we find smelter contact information and directly go talk to them, and…engage with the 
smelters. So we either try to email them, try to call them, and then meet them in person. 
We find that's the most effective way to get them engaged and this can be done by going 
directly to the smelter facilities and then another way is to go to conferences where we 
know the smelter representatives are going to be and try to sit down with them to talk. So 
in terms of how smelters become active I think the most important thing is being very 
engaged and having not only your company brand but establish, trying to establish a face 
to face relationship with the smelters, because that way they understand that we want 
them to be successful and that we're going to help them be successful.” 
 
Interviewee 3 elaborated on the importance of networking and participating in gold industry 
conferences:  
“We attended more of the conferences, gold conferences that were held… So we attended 
wherever we could to get more refiners at one place, kind of held sessions on the CFSI 
during these conferences…This was another tactic that we used and it definitely helped, 
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because conferences easily give us face-to-face meetings with most of the refiners and 
smelters.” 
 
Interviewee 1 also identified that leveraging contacts such as traders, researchers, associations, or 
nearby companies that knew a refiner helped legitimize the calls and emails sent by the OEMs 
that are a part of the CFSI. Interviewee 5 elaborated, adding that trade, legislation requirements, 
pressure from civil society and NGOs, and pressure from the jewellery and sustainability 
industries were key to convincing gold refiners to participate in the CFSP. Additionally, 
Interviewee 5 stated that direct customers and prominent OEMs have the most pressure and 
probability to guide refiners and to motivate them to be part of the program. Interviewee 3 also 
spoke to the importance of leveraging industry pressures, as “in the gold industry there is a lot of 
competition. So when one of the gold refiners become active and they are [public] … the other 
refiner tends to agree to the program and wants to go through the program”. Interviewee 5 
echoed that networking was key to identifying smelters and then engaging in outreach efforts, 
stating that in gold, everyone knows everyone and that this is important to leverage. Additionally 
Interviewee 5 identified that building trust was key to develop fruitful discussions. Interviewee 1 
also identified site visits played a large role in helping to build capacity of the smelter to 
undertake the audit process. However, Interviewee 1 explained that SET tactics that achieved 
gold smelter and refiner active status varied by region. For example, in Indonesia, participation 
in conferences and networking with active refiners to identify and engage with other gold 
smelters was key, while those same tactics might or might not work in other regions. Interviewee 
5 stated that it is important to be part of the local culture and speak the local language. 
 
Interviewee 1 stated that another factor was leveraging relationships with the LBMA and RJC - 
specifically in 2014 when the CFSP began cross-listing refiners that were listed as compliant to 
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LBMA or RJC programs. Since the electronics industry makes up a small percentage of the 
global use for gold, these partnerships allowed the CFSP to overcome their inability to apply 
market pressure onto gold refiners. Interviewee 1 elaborated that the LBMA, which conducts 
purity audits, introduced a responsible gold audit. Interviewee 2 also spoke to the success the 
SET found with gold smelters or refiners through the industry associations. Interviewee 5 also 
added that cross listing with the LBMA and RJC was one of the main pathways gold smelters 
and refiners took to achieve active status with the CFSP. Interviewee 4 reinforced that mutual 
recognition of RJC, CFSI, and LBMA compliance was a successful tactic in achieving gold 
smelter and refiner participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 6 echoed this: 
“The very high peak in 2014 was probably when we started working with LBMA and 
RJC…[The LBMA has] a good delivery list for gold, so sometimes when a smelter isn't 
really interested in the electronics industry they will be interested in the gold industry as 
a whole or jewellery industry so we can get a lot more traction when we get the 
associations on board with what we are trying to do…So when we've engaged with the 
industry associations like the LBMA or the RJC…we've been able to get bigger groups of 
smelters engaging in the free audits, because then that's better for their brand and they 
truly believe it's going to help their business whereas maybe the [CFSI] audits doesn't 
really mean that much to them because gold is so different” 
 
Another factor contributing to gold refiners achieving active status, identified by Interviewee 1, 
was that the SET created a sub-team for gold. Furthermore, Interviewee 6 explained that within 
the Gold SET, there were additional efforts to manage smelter engagement (especially mass 
outreach) from the beginning of the engagement process to when the SOR achieved compliance: 
“…When we have a smelter that needs outreach we pick a person within the team that’s 
going to be responsible for that smelter and we call them the “single point of contact” or 
SPOC because obviously we have hundreds of companies that have to deal with these 
conflict minerals, filing and reporting, and everybody want the smelter to be active and 
then compliant. So we found that that sometimes when too many companies are trying to 
reach the smelter or communicating with the smelter it can cause confusion and they 
eventually stop responding … we realized that we understood that it was probably better 
to assign one [CFSI] member company/person to engage with the smelter and so that 
smelter knows exactly who they can go ask questions to, exactly who they need to send 
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documentation to and that has worked out really well because that's the way you 
establish the relationship with refiner.” 
 
Interviewee 4 agreed that the SET was tactical and strategic about engagement, however, in 
contrast to Interviewee 6, added that mass outreach was successful and “helped drive some of the 
participation”.  
 
4.3 Qualitative Results: Empirical Testing of Framework 
 
The second set of results from the qualitative data collection and content analysis are presented 
in this section, where the frequencies of codes are summarized and further analyzed. The purpose 
of the qualitative data analysis was to identify trends in smelter participation and the themes 
found in the deep supplier engagement tactics utilized by the SETs to engage with smelters.  
 
The purpose of conducting semi-structured qualitative interviews was to contextualize and 
clarify the timelines while still allowing the interviewees to speak to their personal experiences 
and nuanced perspectives. The interviewees were able to contextualize these findings, and 
provide a nuanced understanding of how engagement tactics and influential factors contributed 
to smelter and refiner participation in the CFSP. The framework (Sauer and Seuring, 2017) was 
used to deductively perform the content analysis of the transcribed interviews. An inductive 
approach was taken to identify themes emerging from the data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 
2006) that were outside the framework. The results of the content analysis are presented in Table 
3.
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Table 3 Content Analysis of Qualitative Data 
Category/ Practice Code Frequencies Interviews Key Concepts Example (Interviewee #) 
Risk Management 350 6   
Pressure groups 173 6 
- Industry associations 
- Market pressure/ Industry leverage 
- Civil society groups/NGOs 
- Downstream OEM pressure 
Pressures from civil society (5) 
Standards and 
certification 80 6 
- Management system 
- Certified/ compliance 
“The ICDX made it a requirement for smelters to be RMI or 
RMAP compliant in order to be able to export tin” (6) 
Primary supply stability 75 6 - Sourcing - Primary mineral supply 
“Tungsten was really late to the table and such a small 
amount of tungsten actually came out of the region, they 
just didn't really want to engage” (4) 
Governance gaps 22 4 - SC Governance “And created the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative, created its own governance structure” (4) 
Selective monitoring 0 0   
Collaboration 197 6   
Joint development 96 4 
- Mutual benefits 
- Capacity building 
- Cross-recognition 
“You have a much larger group of industries that's covered 
that can apply greater pressure” (4) 
Enhanced 
communication 94 6 
- Engagement/ outreach (Emails, 
letters, phone calls, site visits) 
- Networking/Trust 
“We as member companies started visiting smelter for the 
program” (3) 
Logistical integration 4 1 - Improving infrastructure Leveraging and improving existing infrastructure (1) 
Technological 
integration 3 1 - Technology adoption 
“Some were not too tech savvy, which prevented them from 
getting into the system” (3) 
Continuity 178 6   
SC partner development 77 6 
- Convincing 
- SPOC 
- Initial audit fund 
Then they start engagement through outreach program and 
try to motivate the smelter to be part of the program (5) 
SC visibility 63 6 
- SC visibility 
- Research (ex. conferences) 
- Transparency (information sharing) 
“It is very difficult to track the source of the gold” (3) 
SC partner selection 28 5 - Confirm SORs - Smelter Disposition Team 
“Identifying those intermediates and separating them from 
actual gold refiners” (6) 
Long-term relationships 10 4 - Retaining SORs “Now it's more of a matter of retention” (6) 
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Category/ Practice Code Frequencies Interviews Key Concepts Example (Interviewee #) 
Government 
interventions 93 6   
Direct regulation 64 6 - Dodd-Frank Act - Legislation/law The presence or absence of regulations (2) 
Interactive regulation 13 4 - Complementing OEM efforts - Collaboration 
We also worked closely with government bodies that 
managed these metals (2) 
Government as active 
consumer 11 4 - SGE 
“One of the biggest industry associations we're trying to 
work with is the Shanghai Gold Exchange” (6) 
Facilitating self-
regulation 5 3 - Refiner list 
“The government or government associations have 
collaborated with the CFSP to get smelters to do the audit” 
Contextual 
Dimensions 78 6   
Unique Industry 
Considerations 41 6 - Different/unique The gold sector is the most risky sector (5) 
Liability of Foreignness 37 6 - Cultural/ language barriers - Regional differences 
It also important to be part of the local culture and speak the 
language of the local country (5) 
Pro-activity 
management 56 5   
Learning 21 5 
- CFSI learning/ improvement 
- Education/awareness 
- Lack of understanding 
“Understanding from a Conflict-Free Sourcing Program 
what did we need to change, or do differently” (4) 
Sustainable pro-activity 18 2 - Action orientation - Goal oriented 
“We all agree at the end of the day that we need to do 
something” (4) 
Innovation 12 3 - New sustainability strategy Difficult, no guidebook (5) 
Linkage development 3 2 - Developing linkages at the mine “We worked with a mine site… and helped pull material through the system” (4) 
Stakeholder 
management 2 2 - Stakeholder management 
“We tell them what are the … stakeholder and customer 
requirements for each company” (3) 
Orientation 31 5   
Dedication to SCM 31 5 
- Voluntary action 
- Corporate social responsibility 
- SCM as a priority 
“There were a few companies, especially electronic 
companies, who as a part of their social responsibility 
program wanted to try responsible sourcing or conflict free 
sourcing” (3) 
Dedication to TBL 0 0   
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The deductive content analysis identified that the most frequent sustainable supply chain 
management practices were Pressure groups (173), Joint development (96), and Enhanced 
communication (94). Other frequently identified practices include Standards and certifications 
(80), SC partner development (77), and Primary supply stability (75). Interesting findings 
include that Direct regulation was the most identified Government intervention, and that in the 
Orientation category, only Dedication to SCM was identified. The inductive content analysis 
identified the practice of SC visibility, which falls under the Continuity category. Additionally, 
the inductive content analysis identified a new category – Contextual dimensions. This category 
houses the practices of Liability of Foreignness and Unique industry considerations, both of 
which were identified in all six interviewee responses. 
 
The data was also visually organized in a tree map (Figure 8), a diagram that displays the 
“hierarchical data as a set of nested rectangles of varying sizes” (“Hierarchy charts, 2018), and 
generated in NVivo. In Figure 8 relative size was used to represent the frequency of coding. 
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Figure 8 Tree Diagram of Coding Frequencies Represented by Relative Size (based on interview data)
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4.3.1 Risk Management 
The category of Risk management contained the most number of references. The most frequent 
practices referenced by interviewees were Pressure groups (173) and Standards and 
Certifications (80), followed by Primary supply stability (75), and are further explained below. 
As the practice of Selective monitoring was not found in the interviewees’ responses and the 
practice of Governance gaps was identified infrequently, they will not be further explored. 
 
Pressure groups 
The practice of Pressure groups was the most identified practice, both within the category of 
Risk management, and the framework as a whole. There were a number of different supply chain 
agents that the interviewees identified as exerting pressure onto smelters and refiners in order to 
convince them to participate in the CFSP, including OEMs, industry associations (LBMA, RJC, 
etc.), civil society, NGOs, traders, smelters and refiners, global witnesses, and governments. 
 
Interviewee 5 stated that important agents that exert pressure onto smelters and refiners include 
legislative requirements and pressures from civil society and NGOs, jewellery and other industry 
pressures. Interviewee 1 also stressed the importance of leveraging a gatekeeper who knew the 
smelter (such as traders, or leaders of associations, or a nearby company) in order to apply 
pressure and achieve active status of that smelter. However, Interviewee 5 stated that direct 
customers, such as OEMs and banks, have the most pressure and probability to guide SORs and 
to motivate them to be part of the program. Interviewee 2 agreed, stating that as direct customers, 
when multiple large companies were able to put pressure on the upstream smelters and refiners, 
they were effective in pushing SORs to active status. Both Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 2 
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believed that leveraging the tin and tungsten industry associations as well as working closely 
with governments that managed 3TG metals were effective tactics.  
 
Multiple interviewees spoke to the pressures exerted by the CFSI member firms and the SET 
members onto SORs being successful in achieving smelter and refiner participation. Interviewee 
6 stated that “when a smelter sees that all these companies are asking for them to join and then 
you combine that with the face to face interaction and the hand holding of getting them ready for 
the audit then they're more likely to be successful”. Interviewee 4 identified that the absence of 
supply chain pressure was a factor that impeded smelters and refiners from participating in the 
CFSP, and elaborated on the importance of the SET outreach in applying pressure to SORs: 
“…[the SET] started to be more tactical and strategic about engagement…direct pressure could 
now be applied because they understood which suppliers of theirs were using these smelters”. 
When it came to market pressures, Interviewee 1 stated that industry demand was able to get a 
100% participation rate in tantalum SORs because a majority of the tantalum SORs are part of 
the electronic industry. Interviewee 4 agreed, identifying the NGO and regulatory pressures 
driving the CFSIs efforts, and stated that the tantalum space, “is where [the electronics] industry 
had the greatest leverage… [as] the electronics industry used I think roughly 60% of the worlds 
tantalum, so we had a lot of leverage there through a couple major buyers”. Interviewee 4 also 
spoke to the need of having multiple sectors, such as “aerospace, automotive, medical devices, 
jewellery”, apply pressure to smelters and refiners. For example, Interviewee 1, Interviewee 3, 
and Interviewee 6 discussed that since the use for gold by industry is primarily jewellery and 
banks and the electronics industry makes up a small portion, the SET needed to work with 
associations such as the LBMA, the RJC and SGE in order to find success.  
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Standards and certifications 
The practice of Standards and certifications was the second most identified practice under the 
Risk management category. This category was coded to references to the development of the 
CFSP and to referenced standards and certifications as factors driving or inhibiting smelter and 
refiner participation in the CFSP. 
 
In developing the CFSP, Interviewee 1 stated the importance of cross-listing the CFSP and 
LBMA. Interviewee 5 expanded on this, stating that gold refiners who believed that they would 
not see any positive effect in the CFSP, wanted to be LBMA compliant because they believe that 
LBMA will get access to international markets. Interviewee 3 also mentioned the role Standards 
and certifications played in driving competitiveness for market access, especially in the gold 
industry. However, Interviewee 4 identified that success of Standards and certifications (along 
with legislation) are dependent upon the specific industry: “within the 3T space, given the closed 
pipe systems, untagged material was discounted. And so if you were trying to cheat the system, 
your bag of tantalum or tin was worth less if it didn't have a tag”, adding, however, that in the 
gold industry “illegal gold is worth more than legal gold”. 
 
Standards and certifications played a role in motivating smelters and refiners to become active 
and then compliant participants in the CFSP. In developing the CFSP procedures, Interviewee 5 
stated that in order to get active status smelters and refiners needed to sign the audit agreement as 
a precondition on active status. Interviewee 1 described that by leveraging the published smelter 
list – which identifies smelters and refiners that were active, inactive, and compliant – the SETs 
were able to motivate suppliers to participate so that they could be on the next quarterly list. 
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However, as Interviewee 1 describes, this tactic did not work all the time, since some smelters 
did not see the impact on their bottom line of being publically listed as compliant. Leveraging 
compliance to Standards and certifications as a way to access international markets, was another 
tactic. This applies particularly to tantalum and to tin in Indonesia. Interviewee 1 stated that it is 
very difficult to sell tantalum unless the smelter or refiner is listed as conflict-free and 
Interviewee 6 spoke to this tactic being utilized in collaboration with legislation in the tin 
industry as “the ICDX and RMI collaborated and the ICDX made it a requirement for smelters 
to be [CFSP] compliant in order to be able to export tin from Indonesia.” 
 
In contrast, weak standards and certifications inhibited some 3TG SORs from participating in the 
CFSP. Interviewee 2 stated that Chinese gold smelters and refiners abide by SGE policies and 
resist other certifications as they are seen as unnecessary. Additionally, in the case of tin, the 
associated costs of the Standards and certifications inhibited participation, as Interviewee 3 
stated“…called being conflict free would become more of a secondary factor for the smelters, 
because they were more into getting their [export] licenses in place”. 
 
Primary supply stability 
The third most identified practice within the category Risk management, was Primary supply 
stability. Primary supply stability was coded to interviewees’ responses that referenced 
suppliers’ needs to ensure security of their mineral supplies and access to markets. Interviewee 1 
identified that by leveraging access to markets, the CFSI was able to get 100% of tantalum 
smelters and refiners aligned very quickly, because so much of them were a part of the 
electronics industry. Interviewee 4 echoed this stating that in the tantalum supply chain: 
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“we don't want to not support legitimate sourcing from the region. So we made sure that 
there was elements in our program to allow and facilitate in-region sourcing…. to make 
sure we could allow legitimate, validated conflict free material into the international 
markets… to make sure we could manage this and that we did not create any de facto 
embargo of material out of the region.” 
 
Interviewee 3 and Interviewee 6 spoke to Primary supply stability, when stating that in the tin 
industry local tax laws in Indonesia forced SORs to focus more time and resources on their day 
to day production to ensure profitability, such that their goals of becoming conflict free or 
participating in the CFSP became secondary. Additionally, both Interviewee 3 and Interviewee 6 
stated that being compliant and listed as conflict-free was also secondary to small smelters and 
refiners.  When speaking about the gold industry, Interviewee 4 added “threats of either change 
or lose business” were effective tactics employed by the SETs in order to achieve smelter and 
refiner participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 3 also spoke to competition between gold suppliers 
for market access serving as a driving factor that enables gold smelters and refiners to participate 
in the CFSP. 
 
Additionally, Interviewee 2 stated that if a smelter or refiner was sourcing from a non-covered 
region, it was a challenge to get smelters and refiners in regions where they are mined, to join a 
program that determines if they source from Central Africa. Interviewee 1 provided Indonesia as 
an example, stating that to Indonesian tin smelters and refiners, it did not make sense to source 
from anywhere other than Indonesia. Interviewee 4 echoed this phenomenon when describing the 
tungsten industry’s reluctance to participate in the CFSP stating: 
“…the tungsten industry said do not source from the DRC. And so they actually did 
create [an effective or default] embargo by taking their position. "Oh we're not sourcing 
from the region, it's too expensive, it's not worth our effort. We get so little from that, why 
do we need a whole due diligence program, [when] we don't source from the region”.” 
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Interviewee 4 also stated that the CFSI encouraged market access for smelters and refiners, 
through the initial audit fund, and the CFSP audit policy: 
“The early adopters fund, which was a couple of companies came together and provided 
funding to help offset the cost of the audit… But that transition into the fund that now 
exists that pays for the customer's first audit…they then had, if you pass your first two 
audits, and you don't source from the covered countries, you can get an audit once every 
three years, and so that enticed people who don't source from the region to say hey you 
know this is way too expensive, but if you cut your costs by a third, it becomes, your cost 
to global market access is much lower and makes good business sense.”   
 
Interviewee 5 identified the cross-recognition with the LBMA as a factor that leveraged market 
access when encouraging smelters and refiners to be part of the CFSP, stating that smelters and 
refiners gave the SET indication that they would not see any positive effect in the CFSP, but they 
wanted LBMA compliance because they believe that will get them access into international 
markets. 
 
4.3.2 Collaboration 
The category of Collaboration was the second largest category based on number of references in 
the qualitative data. The most frequently mentioned practices were Joint Development (96) and 
Enhanced Communication (94), which are explored in detail below. Due to infrequency of 
mention in the interviews, the practices of Logistical integration and Technological integration 
will not be further explored. 
 
Joint development 
The practice of Joint development was the most frequently identified practice in the 
Collaboration category. The foundation of the CFSI was, as Interviewee 4 describes, the joint 
effort of EICC and GeSI: 
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“…And that's the joint effort of EICC and GeSI- they came together and created the 
Extractives Working Group… and they started formulating a process… Then we kind of 
formalized and created the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative, [and] created its own 
governance structure. And so, but I think there was a lot of supply chain collaboration 
occurring, there's communications to the civil society organizations, the NGOs, that were 
monitoring these activities. And so there was an upward momentum of pressure to 
continue to advance, to get greater participation.” 
 
Interviewee 1 identified that through the CFSI, member firms were given flexibility in how and 
to what degree they participated depending upon the commitment and resources they had 
available. For example, some member firms were comfortable talking to governments, others 
had the budget to travel, and others sent emails and conducted phone calls. Interviewee 1 stated 
that the collaborative nature of the CFSI and the SETs included Joint development and capacity 
building because without the SETs, each member firm could have contacted industry 
representative, smelters, and refiners on their own, providing them with different information, 
and leveraging what they could. However, Interviewee 1 added that banding together created a 
lot of efficiencies and built capacity. Additionally, Interviewee 1 spoke to Joint development 
when stating that member firms often spoke with smelters and refiners that were not part of their 
own supply chain, but were nonetheless satisfied to contribute to the greater benefit of the CFSI.  
 
Interviewee 5 also spoke to Joint development with cross-recognition of prominent and 
influential industry associations. In the gold mineral industry, the CFSI chose to work with the 
LBMA and RJC, a decision that led to an increase in gold smelters and refiners participating in 
the CFSP. Interviewee 6 also elaborated on the collaboration between the CFSI and industry 
associations as being successful in SORs engaging the free audits. When asked to describe the 
factors that enable smelters to participate, Interviewee 4 echoed that “collaboration with 
members of the supply chain” such as industry members, civil society members, and 
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governments was important. Interviewee 4 continued, explaining that the collaboration of the 
CFSI’s member firms was novel, as these firms are competitors in a very competitive industry: 
“The only thing I would say, when we talked about the supply chain collaboration, there 
are examples where [two companies] participated together, and they're like mortal 
enemies, competitors to each other. And I think also… the tantalum industry was very a 
vicious industry without much collaboration. But when [the CFSI] came out, and this is 
where we saw a lot of collaboration occurring, which I think did surprise a lot of folks…. 
And the electronics industry is actually very competitive, and they do like to outdo each 
other…[and] nothing [like the CFSI] existed out there, and so, nobody had invested 
interest at the point of time we were implementing.” 
 
Interviewee 4 also added that the collaborative nature of the CFSI has spread beyond member 
firms, industry associations, and those within the mineral supply chain, to now include multiple 
industries, and that the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and cross industry collaboration helped overcome 
barriers associated with multi-industry uses of gold: 
“And we… started off as the electronics industry joint effort of EICC and GeSI and we 
realized for us to be successful, we needed to open to other industry. And that's why we 
very quickly… allowed other entities and industry associations to participate and 
…allowed them a seat at the table. And also Dodd-Frank was multi industry, so that 
allowed us, they could no longer hide, they're going to have to meet their failings, they're 
going to have obligation to import, to disclose… I think now GeSI and EICC still account 
for initially is about 120 but there's over 200 not-EICC/GeSI members, so now its swung 
to non-electronics or non-large electronics companies, that are in the space, aerospace, 
automotive, medical devices, jewellery, you have a much larger group of industries that's 
covered that can apply greater pressure and that really also started in the 2012-2013 
timeframe, because people realized they're going to need that information, country of 
origin information to help meet their disclosure obligations under Dodd Frank. ” 
 
Enhanced communication 
The second most frequently identified practice in the category of Collaboration is the practice of 
Enhanced communication. All six interviewees identified communication between member firms 
and between member firms and smelters and refiners as important to achieving smelter and 
refiner participation in the CFSP. Enhanced communication was identified as the SETs, their 
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mass outreach tactics, networking efforts, and the sharing of information between agents in the 
supply chain. The interviewees identified emails, phone calls, messaging apps (such as 
WhatsApp), letters, and in-person site visits as essential communication tactics that enabled the 
CFSP to be successful in achieving smelter and refiner participation. However, these tactics do 
vary across industry and geographic regions.  
 
Interviewee 1 identified that communication so deeply in a supply chain and across so many 
actors can be challenging, leading to a loss in the ability to have nuanced discussions, and that 
the message needs to be specific. Interviewee 6 explained that the mass outreach form of 
communication was not always successful, but there were efforts by the SETs to manage smelter 
engagement from the beginning of the engagement process to when the smelter or refiner 
achieves compliance in the form of the SPOCs. Interviewee 1 added that to address this, the 
SETs have been helpful in that they designate SPOCs, but sometimes wires were crossed. 
Interviewee 2 echoed the value of the SETs, stating that at first it was the U.S. team reaching out, 
however the development of the SETs and the SET sub-teams greatly increased engagement. 
Interviewee 6 echoed that outreach in the form of  “face to face interaction and the hand holding 
of getting them ready for the audit” were successful in encouraging smelter and refiner 
participation in the CFSP.  Interviewee 3 further elaborated on the importance of the outreach 
tactics and the role the SETs played in overcoming communication barriers and achieving 
smelter and refiner active statuses especially through site visits and direct face-to-face contact 
with the smelters: 
“The reason behind [site visits] was we did see a lot of communication barriers, 
language barriers, in the letters and emails we sent. Examples, some smelters did not 
understand the language that we were communicating, mostly English. Some were not 
too tech savvy, which prevented them from getting into the system, understanding the 
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CFSI system. So what we did was, as member companies… we requested the smelters for 
personal visits to their locations. Going there, helping them, making them understand the 
legal requirements also explaining to them why we are driving the program of conflict 
free, what happens in certain areas, that is what played a major role. I think the SET 
team played a major role”. 
 
Interviewee 4 identified that enhanced communication and levels of trust were needed between 
the agents in the supply chain in order to address concerns with “business confidential 
information [and] lack of awareness” as “there was business confidential information that 
downstream customers should not see”. Interviewee 5 reiterated the importance of building trust, 
stating that the first step in outreach is building a level of trust in order to have fruitful 
discussion. Interviewee 5 also spoke to the importance of networking, and strategically 
leveraging communication channels with existing partners, stating that in the gold supply chain, 
everyone knows each other, and it is key to get to know everyone in the network. Interviewee 5 
identified that a key communication tactic was meeting with key decision makers (such as 
CEOs), to ensure a meeting is successful. They further explained that there were, of course, 
several experiences where a discussion call was not successful, but it was not by reason of the 
communication tactic employed, but rather the SORs’ conviction that the OEMs conducting the 
outreach were not part of their downstream customer chain.  
 
4.3.3 Continuity 
The category of Continuity was the third largest category based on number of references. Within 
this category, the most frequently mentioned practices were SC partner development (77) and SC 
visibility (63). Due to their infrequency, SC partner selection and Long-term relationships will 
not be discussed in detail. 
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SC partner development 
SC partner development was the most identified practice in the category of Continuity. SC 
partner development was coded to references made to convincing identified suppliers to 
participate in the CFSP. 
 
In order to overcome the challenge of communicating deeply in a supply chain, and across 
multiple actors, Interviewee 1 identified the need to have specific messaging and requests. 
Interviewee 6 agreed, adding that after conducting a supplier survey every year to identify 
smelters in the supply chain, the suppliers are asked by the CFSI, “…to engage with their supply 
chain so that they can convince people to join the program…and try to sit down with them to 
talk…because that way they understand that we want them to be successful”. Interviewee 1 
continued, adding that in the gold industry, there is a challenge with banks (who are and the 
primary direct customers of gold refiners) not exerting pressure onto suppliers. Thus it is 
important to communicate with SORs and, as Interviewee 1 summarizes, to share why an SOR is 
important to them and relevant. Interviewee 5 agreed with this, stating that when smelters and 
refiners do not believe that OEMs are customers, it is key to explain that while they are not direct 
customers, the OEMs are still in the supply chain. Interviewee 3 continued, stating that most 
SORs “are not aware of what the CFSI is, [and] some of them in developing countries are not so 
familiar with the code of responsible sourcing” and that when SETs visit SORs, help them, 
explain the legal requirements and  “why [the CFSI is] driving the program of conflict free, what 
happens in certain areas, that is what played a major role [in achieving active status].”  
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The importance of SC partner development was also identified by Interviewee 1, who stated that 
the tin smelters and suppliers who held-out after 2014 on participating the CFSP, were finally 
convinced to participate. When trying to convince suppliers to participate in the CFSP, 
Interviewees 1, 5, and 6 spoke to importance of the SETs assigning a single point of contact 
(SPOC) to each identified supplier, in order to develop them into an active, and then compliant 
participant. Interviewee 1 stated that the SET has been helpful in that they designate SPOCs in 
order to communicate deeply in the supply chain and make suppliers understand that it was real 
request and to make them feel less hesitant about the audit by explaining the audit and helping 
them understand the audit. Thus, through SC partner development, capacity building happened at 
the same time as contact.  
 
Another SC partner development tactic used by the SETs and SPOC is the Initial Audit Fund, 
which CFSI member firms contribute to in order to subsidize the cost of a supplier’s first audit 
with the CFSP. Interviewee 6 spoke to the effectiveness of this fund, stating that in the tin 
industry the initial peaks of participation are due to the Initial Audit Fund, which incentivized 
SORs to join the program, adding, however, when SORs are required to pay for their subsequent 
audits, retention of SORs in the program becomes a concern. Interviewee 4 also spoke to the 
effectiveness of the Initial Audit Fund in the gold and tungsten industries, and added that if an 
SOR passes their first two audits and does not source from a covered country, they are only 
required to get an audit once every three years.  This incentivized SORs who do not source from 
the region to cut their costs by one-third, resulting in the “cost to global market access [being] 
much lower and make[ing] good business sense”. 
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SC visibility: 
The practice of SC visibility is not found in the original framework, and thus, was not 
deductively coded. Rather, references to SC visibility were identified in the qualitative data 
through the inductive content analysis process. The interviewees described two aspects of SC 
visibility: first, OEMs establishing visibility to smelters upstream in their supply chains, and 
second, upstream smelters and refiners identifying OEMs as downstream customers.  
 
The interviewees identified many challenges OEMs face when trying to determine smelters and 
refiners upstream in their supply chains. Interviewee 1 identified it can be hard for OEMs to 
identify SORs and confirm if they are operational, since there are lots of “mom and pop” 
producers who lack significant presence. Interviewee 1 explained that it could require a lot of 
fact checking, such as looking at conference lists, or asking other refiners if they knew a 
particular small smelter to confirm identity. Interviewee 2 stated that visibility (or lack thereof) 
was a large factor that could prevent smelters from being engaged. Interviewee 5 stated that 
research, done by member firms, played a role in understanding the definition of a typical 
smelter or refiner and then submitting information and proof (through the Supplier Identification 
Survey) to the Supplier Disposition Team to determine the smelter’s eligibility. Interviewee 6 
also emphasized the importance of the survey in overcoming the challenge of “twisting through 
the supply chain” to identify upstream suppliers. Interviewee 4 explained that increasing 
transparency in the mineral supply chain was a priority when creating the CFSI and furthermore 
“that the smelters were the pinch point in the supply chain and that we could actually have good 
visibility, fairly good visibility down to the smelters, so that was kind of the focus and validated 
the concept of the Conflict-Free Smelter Program”. Interviewee 4 noted that the SGE decreased 
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transparency in the gold supply chain. Lastly, when upstream smelters and refiners try to 
determine their downstream OEMs in their supply chains, Interviewee 1 identified that the SETs 
had to make SORs understand that the SET requests were real and that the member OEMs were, 
in fact, a downstream customer before the smelter or refiner committed to participate in the 
CFSP. 
 
4.3.4 Government Interventions 
The category of Government interventions was the fourth largest category based on number of 
references. The most frequently identified practice was Direct regulation (64). Interactive 
regulation (13) was the second most identified practice. Government as active consumer, and 
Facilitating self-regulation had few references within this category and will not be further 
discussed. 
 
Direct regulation 
All six interviewees identified Direct regulation in their responses. Direct regulation was 
referenced as, both, being a factor that drove smelter and refiner participation in the CFSP, and a 
factor impeding participation. Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 all identified the U.S. 2010 Dodd-Frank 
Act as a primary driving factor that enabled or promoted smelter and refiner participation in the 
CFSP. Interviewee 5 identified legislation, participation in the Dow Jones Index, and the 
reporting needs of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as forces driving SOR 
participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 3 emphasized “most of the push …for the smelter to get 
into the CFSP program came when the Dodd Frank came into place”. Interviewee 4 elaborated 
that the Dodd-Frank helped foster multi-industry collaboration and also spoke to the influence of 
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international initiatives (such as the Dodd-Frank Act, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and 
the SEC reporting requirements) in identifying and targeting smelters and refiners as the pinch 
point in the mineral supply chain. 
 
When speaking to Direct regulation being a barrier that prevented smelters and refiners from 
participating in the CFSP, national regulations were identified by multiple interviewees. 
Interviewee 2 stated that the presence or absence of local regulations impeded smelters from 
participating.  Interviewee 3 and Interviewee 6 explained that meeting licencing and tax 
requirements took priority over participation in the CFSP, as these local legislations created 
financial barriers and barriers to export that created reluctance to participate in the CFSP. 
Interviewee 4 echoed that the presence of ineffective local legislation resulted in illegal gold 
being worth more than legal gold and, thus, created a barrier impeding gold smelters and refiners 
from participating in the CFSP. Interviewee 1 identified that the lack of consistent international 
regulation impeded the participation of foreign smelters and refiners from participating in the 
CFSP. Interviewee 1 further elaborated that since the Dodd-Frank Act is a U.S. law, and 
European law was based in the European Union, there was difficulty in convincing Chinese 
smelters and refiners to be a part of the program.  
 
Interactive regulation 
Interactive regulation was coded to references to governments cooperating with the CFSP. Four 
interviewees identified the practice of Interactive regulation as both a factor that enabled and 
impeded smelter and refiner participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 1 identified the need to 
collaborate with government, involve embassies, and work with an aggregator or semi-regulatory 
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body in order to successfully drive participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 2 also spoke to 
working closely with government bodies that managed 3TG metals. Interviewee 4 spoke to the 
CFSI being “actively engaged in development of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance”. 
Interviewee 6 also added that active collaboration and engagement between the CFSI and the 
ICDX (Indonesia Trade Derivatives Exchange) enabled successful participation in the CFSP. 
 
4.3.5 Pro-activity Management 
The category of Pro-activity Management contained was the second smallest category based on 
number of references. Within this category, Learning (21) and Sustainable pro-activity (18), and 
Innovation (12) were the most frequently referred to practices, and are described in further detail 
below.  Linkage development and Stakeholder management had the fewest references within this 
category, and due to their infrequency will not be further explored. 
 
Learning 
The most frequent practice in the category of Pro-activity management was Learning. 
Interviewee 5 identified that there was “no guidebook”, and there were some difficulties in 
developing effective SET deep supplier engagement strategies. Interview 1 also spoke to the 
lessons learned in developing the program and, after learning, of areas of improvement to 
develop new strategies, such as the Smelter Disposition Team to address inefficiencies. 
Interviewee 2 elaborated that learning led to the development of local SET teams, as the initial 
US and Canadian teams did not have the capacity to do outreach to the degree of success as the 
local SET teams are doing now. Interviewee 1 also identified that the CFSI strategically created 
audits that included room for continuous improvement for the smelters and refiners. Interviewee 
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4 spoke to working closely with industry associations, smelters and refiners, audit firms, and 
OEMs in order to develop the CFSI. Interviewee 4 also spoke to the phenomenon of non-
industry members learning of the CFSI and from the CFSP and, in turn, contributing to 
improvements in the program:  
“And you start to get a level of trust, not that everybody agreed, but I think civil society, 
the Global Witnesses, out there, realized that industry was making process, were trying to 
solve this, and it wasn't going to happen overnight, but at least them having the 
opportunity to see what was being done, how it was being done and then to critique it and 
to provide some input, help develop the relationships.”  
 
Sustainable pro-activity 
The practice of Sustainable pro-activity is not found in the Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) minerals 
supply chain management framework, which includes Environmental pro-activity within the 
category of Pro-activity management. However, the qualitative data does not make any reference 
to environmental initiatives, but rather, to the social sustainability outreach, responsibility, and 
initiatives put forward by the OEMs, in efforts to pro-actively manage their mineral supply 
chains. Interviewee 1 spoke to the action-oriented nature of the SET being a model in corporate 
sustainability, and to the importance of the SET being goal and action oriented, led by a group of 
leader OEMs who believed there should be a working goal. Interviewee 4 echoed the statement 
that the CFSI is a model of Pro-activity management and also spoke to the action oriented goals 
that led to the creation of CFSI and its evolution into “a model, that's been starting to be used 
across a number of different fronts, whether it's forced labour, child labour, other commodities, 
as kind of a benchmark”. 
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Innovation 
Interviewees 1 and 5 speak to innovation in the context of developing the CFSI as a new and 
novel business model, and of writing their own guidebook. Interviewee 4 continues, adding that 
innovation is a process, where the rate of innovation changes as the CFSI matures: 
“…And so, we were able to get far enough along and start getting things in and were 
able to set the model and the template. And now it's kind of caught up and change is now 
much slower and the thing moving forward is much slower. But that's not necessarily by 
design, it's just because it happens as things mature. And then they should - hopefully 
you're getting it right so therefore you don't need a lot of change. But that was one of the 
reasons we were able to make good progress in such a short period of time.” 
 
4.3.6 Orientation 
The category of Orientation contained the fewest occurrences among codes. Within this 
category, the interviewees only identified the practice of Dedication to SCM (31). The practice of 
Dedication to TBL was not found in the interviewees’ responses. 
 
Dedication to SCM 
Dedication to SCM was identified by five of the six interviewees. There were two concepts 
within Dedication to SCM – the CFSI and member OEMs’ SCM orientation and the smelter and 
refiners’ orientation to SCM.  
 
When speaking to smelter or refiners’ commitment to SCM, Interviewee 1 identified that 
smelters or refiners that did not participate in the CFSP were those who did not understand it or 
who had different priorities. The OEMs and CFSI’s Dedication to SCM was identified by 
Interviewee 1, who stated that initially all the OEMs tried to do SCM themselves when 
describing the origins of the CFSI. Interviewee 3 echoed this stating that “there were some other 
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companies which were doing it voluntarily… as a part of their corporate social 
responsibility…”. Interviewee 5 also acknowledged that it was a new phenomenon that 
companies were becoming more responsible for the entire supply chain.  
 
When describing SOR orientation to SCM, Interviewee 3 explained that SOR unfamiliarity with 
SCM was a barrier preventing participation, as “some of them in developing countries are not so 
familiar with the code of responsible sourcing”. However, Interviewee 3 described a change in 
smelter and refiner orientation driving towards a Dedication to SCM, as now “refiners are 
becoming more knowledgeable when it comes to conflict free”. Interviewee 6 spoke to the 
success of the outreach efforts, including a stage where the SET needs to convince the smelter or 
refiner to adopt SCM and “do the right thing basically”. 
 
4.3.7 Contextual Dimensions 
The category of Contextual dimensions was not a part of Sauer and Seuring’s 2017 framework of 
sustainable mineral supply chain management. This category, and the two practices within it – 
Liability of foreignness and Unique industry considerations – were identified through the 
inductive content analysis process. They are described in further detail below. 
 
Unique industry considerations 
The practice of Unique industry considerations was the most identified practice, within the 
category of Contextual dimensions. Unique industry considerations was coded to interviewees’ 
responses that referenced that each 3TG metal industry was different, and the CFSI and SETs’ 
need to overcome different barriers in each metal’s industry in order to successfully engage with 
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suppliers deep within the supply chain and achieve smelter and refiner active status in the CFSP. 
As each interviewee was asked to speak to their area of expertise, the majority of the codes 
reference excerpts such as “specific metals” or “specific industries or sectors”.   
 
All the interviewees, however, mention gold and the gold industry as being especially unique and 
different from the 3T metals. Interviewee 5 described the gold sector as the most “risky sector”, 
and the closest to those doing “risky business”. Interviewee 1 stated that gold was the most 
challenging and the hardest, the industry where the SET tactics have been least successful, and 
that required different tactics than other metals. Interviewee 1 explained that this was due to the 
numerous uses for gold, such as currency and jewellery, the high value of small amounts of gold, 
extensive trading, and, along with Interviewee 3, addressed the secretive and competitive nature 
of the gold industry. Interviewee 4 also spoke to gold being unique from the 3T metals, stating 
that gold usually has a “long tail of refiners to it just because of the ease of refining and the 
value of gold” and there are “a lot more players in [the gold] space”. Furthermore, gold is a 
“high value commodity at a very low volume, whereas the other ones much lower value with 
higher volume. And gold is very different even on the ground in the Congo” (Interviewee 4). 
Interviewee 6 reiterated that the uniqueness of the gold industry and it being a “harder metal to 
tackle” is due to a number of reasons: the ease of having a gold refinery anywhere; high rates and 
relative ease of recycling gold, difficulties tracking gold due to small quantities having large 
profits; the electronics industry’s lack of leveraging power in the gold space; gold being a big 
part of the jewellery industry; and that people aren’t always aware of the issues surrounding the 
gold industry. 
 
		 73	
Liability of foreignness 
The practice of Liability of foreignness was the second inductively identified practice in the 
Contextual dimensions category. Liability of foreignness was coded to interviewees’ responses 
that referenced the CFSI and SETs’ need to acknowledge and overcome barriers such as 
language, culture, foreign business practices, and geographic distance, in order to successfully 
engage with suppliers deep within their supply chains and achieve smelter and refiner active 
status in the CFSP.  
 
Interviewee 1 referenced Liability of foreignness, explaining that SET outreach tactics depends 
on the region or that there were language-gaps that required translators to overcome. 
Additionally, Interviewee 1 spoke to foreign business practices, mentioning, for example, that in 
Indonesia, no one does business by email. Interviewee 2 listed a number of challenges that face 
the SETs in specific regions: language, time zones, and cultural barriers. Interviewee 5 also 
spoke to these challenges, stating that it was important to be part of the local culture and to speak 
the language of the local country, and further added that in order to reach the key contact, 
colleagues that spoke the correct language had to be leveraged. Interviewee 4 identified that the 
location of a smelter or refiner played a role in the pressure supply chain agents were able to 
exert onto the supplier. Interviewee 2 also stated that initial outreach efforts involved the U.S. 
team reaching out to smelters and refiners at first, but the development of the SET, and then the 
sub-teams, greatly increased engagement. Interviewee 3 echoed this statement: “Creating local 
SET teams also helped, because only the US and Canada initially, could not do the outreach that 
the local SET team is doing now”. Interviewee 3 identified that Liability of foreignness was a 
key motivator driving the types of deep supplier engagement tactics the SETs employed in order 
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to be successful in “Breaching language [and] breaching communication” barriers that impede 
SOR participation in the CFSP. Interviewee 6 also spoke to the types of deep supplier 
engagement tactics needing to be culturally specific: 
“The thing we experienced in Indonesia is that smelters don't like to read or respond to 
emails. So we've recognized that its very very important, especially in Indonesia 
culturally to have that face to face relationship and show up to a conference, stay in 
touch with the smelter you got to be compliant because if we don't, we've seen smelters 
fall off the compliant list …So we know that for Indonesia, we have to constantly be there. 
Somebody from the RMI has to be there for the conference, or for the audit and stay in 
touch that way and through WhatsApp which, the messaging app, everybody uses it there 
too… Phone calls- they work if you have, if you can find a phone number, because most 
smelters in Indonesia don't even have a website and then there's the language barrier 
because not everybody speaks English. Fortunately we do have a few RMI members who 
speak Bahasa Indonesia, which is the local language, and we have been successful that 
way. But if I tried to call and talk to them in English, they're not comfortable, even if they 
speak English, they're not comfortable speaking on the phone or they're embarrassed or 
whatever so they just don't want to talk to you over the phone.”  
 
In regards to a specific region being more difficult to successfully, engage with, Interviewee 1 
identified geographic China as a problem. Interviewee 6 reiterated, stating that China “is one of 
the hardest regions” for reasons including the Chinese Shanghai Gold and the uniquely complex 
nature of the gold industry. Interviewee 4 reinforced this, adding that the SGE played a role in 
decreasing upstream supply chain visibility: 
“Within China, the Shanghai Gold Exchange, the gold would go in and go out, there was 
no tracking of who got what gold… so if you tried to chase the gold supply chain, it was 
always stopped at the exchange, and so you really didn't know who your refiners were, so 
you couldn't necessarily put pressure on them. And then also, gold, it has such a long tail 
of refiners to it just because of the ease of refining and the value of gold. You have a lot 
more players in that space. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion  
 
5.1 Discussion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the tactics that allow the CFSI and SETs to engage 
deeply in their supply chains, beyond the visible horizon. The research questions were: What are 
the mechanisms of deep supply chain engagement used by CFSI member OEMs to connect with 
upstream producers? How effective are they? How do OEMs work together to engage suppliers? 
 
This thesis successfully researched deep supplier engagement and determined the mechanisms of 
deep supply chain engagement used by CFSI member OEMs to connect with upstream 
producers. Downstream OEMs work together to engage suppliers deeply in their supply chains, 
beyond the visible horizon, though employing tactics of deep supplier engagement, which were 
successfully identified in the qualitative analysis and reinforced by the timeline analysis. These 
tactics are summarized in Section 5.4.  
 
This research also empirically tested Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) framework of sustainable 
mineral supply chain management, through a convergent parallel mixed methods approach 
(presented in Section 5.2). The results of the deductive content analysis validate the majority of 
the practices and categories identified by Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) framework. The analysis 
provided significant evidence reinforcing understanding of sustainable mineral supply chain 
management practices in the categories of Pressure groups, Joint development, Enhanced 
communication, Direct regulation, and Dedication to SCM. However, none of the interviewees 
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referenced the practices of Selective monitoring and Dedication to TBL in the qualitative results. 
Additionally, there are elements of the framework, identified through the inductive content 
analysis that this research has extended. This extended framework is presented in Section 5.3.  
 
Beyond Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) model, the results also significantly support the findings of 
previous studies, notably Carter et al. (2012), Young (2015), and Young and Dias (2012).  Carter 
et al. (2015) identified agents as actors in a supply chain that look upstream (towards suppliers) 
and downstream (towards buyers), and describes the limit to which an agent is aware of the 
supply chain as the “visible horizon” (p. 93). The distance of this visible horizon is based on 
factors such as cultural distance, physical distance, and closeness centrality (Carter et al., 2015). 
SC visibility is an important factor impacting SSCM; other factors include organizational and 
supply chain complexity (Kim and Davis, 2016). The qualitative results established that in 
mineral supply chains, the barriers impeding SC visibility include cultural and physical distance, 
closeness centrality, and multi-tiered supply chain complexity. This research also determined 
that in order to overcome these barriers and successfully extend their visible horizons, members 
of the CFSI and SETs (i.e. agents) employ deep supplier engagement tactics. Responsible and 
conflict-free sourcing illustrates the need of compliance and SSCM management strategies to 
span multiple tiers of a supply chain in order to address social issues in developing countries 
(Young, 2015). Young (2015) and Young and Dias (2012) discuss the use of smelters and 
refiners as chokepoints as an effective tool by which downstream OEMs identify and engage 
with upstream suppliers and manage their supply chains. Smelters and refiners were established 
to be the pinch point as at this processing stage in the supply chain, the number of actors narrow 
significantly (Young and Dias, 2012).  The CFSI targets SORs “as "gates" where the supply of 
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metal shipments can be controlled and audited” (Young and Dias, 2012, p. 2).  Through 
analysing the qualitative results, this thesis validated targeting deep supplier engagement tactics 
to SORs as an effective and efficient approach to manage social issues in upstream suppliers, 
especially in the 3T spaces. This research also answered the research question “How do OEMs 
work together to engage suppliers?”. Collaboration and participation in meaningful relationships 
with different agents (Carter et al., 2015) builds a firm’s capacity to engage in ethical sourcing 
and address social issues within the supply chain (Roberts, 2003). Young (2015) also spoke to 
collaboration between CFSI member firms coordinating pooled financial resources, expertise, 
and SSCM strategies in order to manage shared supply networks. This thesis provides evidence 
supporting the success of this collaborative approach, as the interviewees refer to the CFSI as 
building capacity in SORs, as well as in the CFSI achieving a greater level of success when 
compared to independent efforts of individual OEMs.  
 
One gap in the current SSCM literature, identified by this thesis, is Liability of Foreignness as a 
barrier in SSCM and Regional Specific Tactics as a means to overcome this barrier (further 
discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4). The impact of cultural and geographic distance is not widely 
discussed in SSCM, business collaboration, and institutional theory, yet the qualitative results 
largely supported the conclusion that a one-size-fits-all approach to SSCM may not be as 
efficient or effective when compared to the CFSI’s nuanced approach to deep supplier 
engagement. 
 
 
		 78	
5.2 Contributions to Scholarship: Methodology 
 
The current work has employed a methodology unique to sustainable supply chain research. 
Unlike many studies, a case study method was not employed.  Rather the research design 
constructed timelines, based on data from the CFSI industry association, which analysed 323 
smelters and refiners, and which then guided semi-structured interviews in a convergent parallel 
mixed methods approach. This research design was well received by the interviewees, as the 
depth of analysis done before the interviews effectively facilitated qualitative data collection by 
allowing interviewees to successfully contextualize the timeline analysis and identify patterns of 
correlation. Furthermore, this convergent parallel mixed methods approach is unique in 
sustainable supply chain management literature. For example: Na (2016) statistically analysed 
timelines describing 3TG SORs; Sauer and Seuring (2017) conducted a structured content-
analysis based literature review; Kim and Davis (2016) conducted a cross-sectional analysis; 
Carter et al. (2015) adopted a conceptual theory building approach; and Young (2015) employed 
qualitative methods. The methodology employed by this thesis included a timeline analysis, 
qualitative methods of data collection, and deductive and inductive content analyses, all of which 
we conducted through the lens of a sustainable mineral supply chain management framework. 
Limitations of this approach are discussed in Section 5.5. 
 
5.3 Contributions to Scholarship: Extending the Framework 
 
The results of the inductive content analysis offered the opportunity to extend Sauer and 
Seuring’s (2017) framework. This study has added the category: Contextual dimensions of 
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Liability of foreignness and Unique industry considerations, as well as the practices of SC 
visibility and Sustainable pro-activity (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9 Refined sustainable supply chain management of minerals framework (current 
analysis, extending Sauer and Seuring, 2017) 
 
5.3.1 SC visibility 
The practice of SC visibility focused on the supply chain transparency that allowed OEMs to 
identify smelters and refiners in their supply chain, as well as the ability for upstream smelters 
and refiners to identify OEMs as downstream customers. Young (2015) describes these 
processes as tracing and tracking, respectively. Increasing SC visibility extends the visible 
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horizon – the depth to which tracing and tracking can occur. SC visibility is outside the scope of 
this research, which focuses on engagement that occurs after an SOR is identified. Nevertheless, 
it is a unique challenge facing mineral supply chains as evident through the qualitative results, 
and further investigation of SC visibility is identified as a direction of future research (Section 
6.2). The decision to house this practice under the category of Continuity derives from Sauer and 
Seuring’s comments about  “Continuity draw[ing] on the SC structure and focus[ing] on building 
long-term relationships with selected SC partners” (Sauer and Seuring, 2017, p. 238). 
 
5.3.2 Liability of Foreignness 
Liability of foreignness is defined as the additional costs multi-national enterprises face when 
doing business abroad due to factors such as unfamiliar environments, cultural, political and 
economic differences, and geographic distance (Zaheer, 1995).  All six interviewees identified 
one or more of these factors when describing the challenges the SETs faced when conducting 
deep supplier engagement. Downstream OEMs were able to overcome these challenges through 
Regionally Specific Tactics (Table 4), which include collaboration (with influential agents like 
industry associations or governments closer to the SOR in question), strategic structure (the 
creation of regional specific SETs), and economic investment (e.g. costs of travel, translations, 
and the Initial Audit Fund), and thus effectively translate the costs of Liability of foreignness into 
participation of SORs in the CFSP.  
 
The current research proposes the practice of Liability of foreignness as a Contextual dimension. 
The category of Contextual dimensions forms the foundation of and guides the Strategic values, 
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SC structure, and SSCM processes that compose Sauer and Seuring’s (2017) framework as well 
as the deep supplier engagement tactics of the CFSI.  
 
5.3.3 Unique Industry Considerations 
Another consideration added to the framework is Unique industry considerations. The selection 
and success of deep supplier engagement tactics (such as mass outreach, leveraging industry 
associations, regulatory pressures, and market pressures) differed between the four 3TG 
industries. Despite their similarities (e.g. SORs as a chokepoint) the interviewees described 
industry specific nuances. Additionally, the nature of the gold and the gold industry being unique 
and different to tin, tantalum, and tungsten is evident through not only the analysis of the 
qualitative results, but also in creation of the Gold SET as the only mineral specific SET – the 
others were designed to be regionally specific. Thus, it is clear that there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to sustainable supply chain management or to sustainable mineral supply chain 
management. This conclusion leads the research to propose the addition of Unique industry 
considerations to the Contextual dimensions category, as the characteristics of each industry 
ground the Strategic values, SC structure, and SSCM processes and guide the application and 
success of deep supplier engagement tactics. 
 
5.3.4 Conflict Minerals as a Sustainability Issue 
The last addition to the framework is the practice of Sustainable pro-activity. Sauer and Seuring 
(2017) identify the practice of Environmental pro-activity, housed under Pro-activity 
management, and define it as “Environmental pro-activity represents a further means to diversify 
from competitors and gain competitive advantages in mineral SCs” (p. 238). However, none of 
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the interviewees alluded to Environmental pro-activity or Dedication to TBL. Rather, they spoke 
to the importance of social sustainability outreach, responsibility, and initiatives put forward by 
the OEMs, in efforts to pro-actively manage their mineral supply chains. This is not surprising as 
the interviewees were SET members; they focused on responsible sourcing and the conflict 
minerals problem, rather than the overall sustainability efforts of their respective firms. This 
disagrees with literature that emphasizes that sustainable supply chain management incorporates 
the three pillars of sustainability – social, economic, and environmental (Seuring and Muller, 
2008; Ahi and Searcy, 2013). The present research proposes the modification of Environmental 
pro-activity to Sustainability pro-activity in an effort to include the social sustainability driven 
focus, responsibility, and initiatives characteristic of sustainable mineral supply chain 
management under the umbrella of sustainable development.  
 
It is of further interest to discuss the success of social sustainability initiatives and the relatively 
lesser success of environmental corporate social responsibility initiatives. Based on the current 
literature and the qualitative results, this thesis summarizes five factors that could contribute to 
the successful management of social sustainability issues when compared to environmental 
sustainability issues: 
 
1. When compared to environmental issues, social issues are harder to identify and manage 
(Esmail, 2017).  
2. Awareness of the severity and visibility of the exploitation of people and abuse of human 
rights through forced labour, sexual violence, and armed conflict in the extraction and 
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manufacturing of conflict minerals is not only significant and worth investigating, but 
could normatively pressure agents in the supply chain to take action.  
3. The nature of the mineral supply chain presents smelters and refiners as clear chokepoints, 
at which downstream OEMs can effectively identify and engage with upstream suppliers 
(Young, 2015). 
4. The presence and enforcement of regulatory requirements demanding socially sustainable 
conflict-free sourcing, such as the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidelines. 
5. Within the electronics industry and the CFSI there are a number of champions, with 
strategic influence and resources, who support sustainable supply chain management. 
Interviewees identified particular individuals and firms (kept anonymous for 
confidentiality) who championed the development of the CFSI and its outreach efforts 
and whose leadership was described as essential to achieving success. 
 
5.4 Contributions to Industry Practice 
 
This thesis contributes to industry practice through the identification of deep supplier 
engagement tactics and the evaluation of their effectiveness in SSCM. Table 4 presents a 
summary of the key engagement tactics identified by the results.  
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Table 4 Summary of Deep Engagement Tactics as Identified by Interviewees 
Type of 
Engagement 
Engagement Tactic & Application 
Education • SETs held CFSI sessions at industry conferences 
• CFSI created Smelter Disposition Team to determine SOR eligibility 
• Downstream OEMs conducted Supplier Identification Survey/ Conflict Minerals 
Reporting Template to determine SORs in their supply chains 
• SETs conducted research to identify and determine SORs and key gatekeepers 
• CFSI held workshops (to engage with governments, civil society members, NGOs) 
Collaboration • CFSI/SETs collaborated with supply chain agents such as industry members, 
industry associations, civil society members, and governments 
• CFSI/SETs collaborated with upstream industry associations 
Incentives • SETs leveraged market access  
• CFSI created and funded the Initial Audit Fund; SETs leveraged this financial 
incentive 
Metal Specific 
Engagement 
• CFSI collaborated with industry associations and cross-recognized compliance 
Legislation • SETs leveraged regulatory pressures and SEC reporting requirements 
Mass 
Outreach 
• SETs communicated with SORs via emails/phone calls/letters/WhatsApp  
Networking • SETs leveraged key industry/SOR contacts 
• SETs attended industry conferences 
Regionally 
Specific 
Engagement 
• CFSI created regionally specific SETs 
• SETs worked with translators 
• SETs/ SPOCs conducted site visits of SORs 
• CFSI collaborated with local governments 
Targeted 
Outreach 
• CFSP identified SORs as choke points in supply chains for targeted engagement 
• SETs/ SPOCs conducted site visits of SORs 
• CFSI/SETs created Single Point of Contact (SPOC) 
• CFSP conducted mock audits 
 
The deep engagement tactics described in Table 4, correlate with many of the peaks of SOR 
participation identified in the timeline analysis. Institutional and stakeholder theory suggest that 
normative and coercive pressures exerted by influential stakeholders can drive supplier 
organizations towards socially responsible practices, when regulatory pressures, economic 
support, industry champions (Sarkis and Zhu, 2007), and multi-sector market pressures 
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(Fitzpatrick et al., 2014) are present. This is evident in the development of the CFSI/SETs and 
the success of their specific and novel deep supplier engagement tactics. The deep supplier 
engagement tactics of Targeted Outreach, Incentives, Regionally Specific Engagement, and Mass 
Outreach stand out as being interesting as well as novel to the CFSI and mineral supply chains. 
 
Targeted Outreach is particularly interesting, as the identification and targeting of a specific 
pinch point of the supply chain (the SOR stage) is unique, as downstream firms skipped over 
their first and second tiers in order to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
engagement. Furthermore, it is interesting, and not often practiced in traditional SCM, that 
OEMs have adapted their business model to fit the needs and convenience of their suppliers. The 
volunteering of OEMs’ time and financial resources to dedicate a SPOC and to conduct 
individual site visits are interesting since, due to the low visibility of the supply network, SPOCs 
may conduct site visits to SORs that do not supply their OEM. One explanation for these unique 
SSCM mechanisms could be that, due to the criticality of the 3TG metals, this adaptive and 
resource intensive approach was necessary. Other critical commodities that may require Targeted 
Outreach include oil and gas and cobalt, which suffer from major environmental and social 
sustainability issues. 
 
Another successful and interesting tactic is Incentives, and particularly the Initial Audit Fund. 
Leveraging market access as a means to achieve compliance to standards is seen in other 
compliance initiatives (e.g. Fair Trade, Forestry Stewardship Council, which label to show 
compliance). However, perhaps due to limited 3TG suppliers and the CFSI’s commitment to 
avoid embargos, the CFSI also provided SORs with financial incentives to promote participation, 
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in the form of the Initial Audit Fund. This tactic was successful (especially in the tin and 
tungsten space), in achieving participation in the CFSP and in maintaining market access for 
these suppliers.  Incentives to achieve compliance while avoiding embargos could be a 
successful tactic in electronics supply chains outside the 3TG space, such as cobalt, which is 
beginning to be considered as a conflict mineral.  
 
The CFSI also practiced Regionally Specific Engagement, through creating regional SET teams, 
conducting site visits, and collaborating with local governments. This tactic enabled downstream 
firms to overcome the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of a one-size-fits-all approach to their 
global supply chain networks. The CFSI is novel in its ability to identify nuanced regional 
differences and successfully respond to those differences with specifically targeted engagement 
approaches. The effectiveness of regional specific SETs and SPOCs to manage nuance was 
identified by the qualitative results and reinforced by the timeline analysis that showed increased 
SOR participation correlating with the creation of the SETs. Other industries characterized by 
global multi-tiered supply chain networks, such as coffee, may benefit from a Regional Specific 
Engagement approach when managing the social and human rights concerns in their supply 
chains. 
 
Lastly, Mass Outreach was identified as an important tactic employed by the CFSI and the SETs. 
This tactic of deep supplier engagement is novel for a number of reasons as Mass Outreach 
involves collaboration and coordination of numerous downstream, and often competitor, firms; 
relies on time and financial resources volunteered by these downstream firms; skips first and 
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second tiered suppliers, to directly target and exert pressure onto SORs deep in the supply chain 
network; and increases the visibility that SORs have in their downstream OEMs.  
 
This investigation of the methods of deep supplier engagement contributes to industry practice, 
through identifying successful supplier engagement tactics that could be adapted to address 
social issues in other mineral or non-mineral supply chains. The effectiveness of the deep supply 
chain engagement tactics employed by the CFSI is influenced by the identification and targeting 
of a pinch point in the supply chain. The coffee supply chain, for example, “is complex as beans 
pass through the hands of growers, traders, processors, exporters, roaster, retailers and finally the 
consumer” (Fair Trade Canada, 2018). Fair Trade created cooperatives as the pinch point in their 
supply chain, where cooperatives (like the SORs) take responsibility for SSCM of the upstream 
farmers they represent.  However, the CFSI’s deep supplier engagement tactics may not be as 
effective when applied to supply chains that do not have a pinch point, those that have human 
rights concerns throughout their supply network, and/or those that do not face the visibility 
challenges characteristic of mineral supply chains. One such industry is textiles where social 
issues and human rights violations occur at multiple stages of manufacturing and production (e.g. 
farming, dyeing, stitching). Furthermore, the joint development and collaboration of industry 
competitors, NGOs, governments, industry associations, and civil society members to conduct 
sustainable supply chain management is a unique characteristic of the CFSI and may serve as a 
model for successful multi-stakeholder initiatives in other industries 
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5.5 Limitations 
 
The limitation of a mixed-methods research design is that qualitative research is difficult to 
replicate (Jick, 1979). This limitation was addressed by designing the interviews to be semi-
structured so that interviews could be replicated. In regards to data collection during the 
interviews, limitations include sample-size, potential bias, and data recording. There are 
approximately 50 members in the SETs and six interviewees participated. The six interviewees 
were from different SET teams, were able to provide expertise in all four 3TG spaces, and had 
knowledge of different geographic regions. They represented OEMs in multiple industries and 
stages in the supply chain (e.g. OEMs and a first-tier supplier). As industry experts identified by 
the CFSI, the interviewees were deemed the most knowledgeable of the CFSI and SETs. As 
members of the CFSI and SET, there is potential that the opinions the interviewees expressed 
were skewed to present a positive reflection of the CFSI/SETs’ efforts, however, when 
evaluating the validity of content analysis of the qualitative semi-structured interviews, it is 
important that the results are consistent with other information about the research topic (Holsti, 
1969). Multiple consistencies between the timeline analysis and the qualitative interviews were 
identified (see Section 4.2), thus the timelines mitigated some of the limitations of the qualitative 
data. Furthermore, when comparing the results of the qualitative data among the different 
interviewees, the interviewees mostly supported each other and there were consistencies as 
multiple interviewees identified the same or similar themes and phenomena. Thus, the validity of 
the analysis is supported. 
 
		 89	
Another limitation of the qualitative research design lies in the accuracy of note taking. As not 
all the interviewees consented to being recorded, researcher notes taken during and after the 
interview may not have captured the data in whole and with complete accuracy. Furthermore, in 
regards to interviews that were recorded and transcribed, there may be potential of minor 
inaccuracies in the transcribing process due to human error and recording quality. The last 
limitation of the research design lies in the analysis, where researcher subjectivity and bias could 
have influenced the coding process and/or the visual representation of the results. 
 
The results and conclusions presented in this thesis are limited in scope to the CFSI, the 
corporations the members of the CFSI and SET represents, and its business collaborations and 
sustainable supply chain management, as they are relevant to the mineral and electronics 
industries. As such, the deep supplier engagement tactics are limited in their generalizability to 
other business-led alliances, as well as SSCM initiatives in other industries. Further empirical 
testing of the revised framework, to understand its application to other mineral supply chains 
(e.g. jewellery, oil and gas, aluminum) and non-mineral supply chains (e.g. coffee, cotton) offer 
the opportunity to reinforce and further revise the framework. 
 
5.6 Directions for Future Research 
 
This study of conflict minerals examined deep supply chain engagement in management 
scholarship at the intersection of sustainable supply chain management, business collaboration, 
stakeholder theory, and institutional theory. This study reinforces, both, these theories underlying 
the development and initiatives of the CFSI, as well as their successful practical applications in 
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industry. The main contributions of this research to scholarship include empirical testing of an 
existing SSCM of minerals framework, the development of a revised sustainable mineral supply 
chain framework, and the use of timelines in a mixed methods approach. The main contributions 
to industry practice include examination of deep supplier engagement tactics and their 
applicability to SSCM. 
 
This research identified a number of areas of further research that would be interesting to explore 
within the field of industry collaboration and SSCM. Firstly, as only a portion of the SET 
members participated in the semi-structured interviews and the timeline analysis was based on 
simple data selection, the cultural and regional barriers were reinforced by qualitative data as the 
topic of cultural barriers came up and are specific to the interviewees’ areas of expertise. It 
would be of value to further investigate cultural and regional barriers outside of those discussed 
in this research (e.g. mining practices in Canada) in order to identify patterns or trends.  The 
identification of SC visibility as an important practice in SSCM of mineral supply chains is also a 
research area of further interest. 
 
It would be interesting to investigate other industries that struggle with social sustainability 
supply chain management, such as cobalt, coffee, forestry, and textiles. Evaluating the 
collaboration practices and deep supplier engagement tactics of their industry associations – such 
as the Forestry Stewardship Council, the Better Cotton Initiative, and Fair Trade – against those 
of the CFSI could allow for the development of multi-industry best management practices. The 
practical implications and effectiveness of determining a pinch point in the supply chain network 
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could be a first step in SSCM of these commodities. Additionally, it would be of value to test the 
modified framework in other mineral industries in order to further develop the model.  
 
A final area of interest, which emerges from the discussions on Sustainable pro-activity and 
Direct regulation, is the difference between social and environmental sustainability legislation 
and SSCM. A proposed area of future research is evaluating the OEM’s CSR initiatives and why 
environmental sustainability initiatives have not reached the level of commitment and success as 
the CFSI’s social sustainability initiatives.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This study employed a parallel convergent mixed methods approach to answer the research 
questions, and in doing so identified: the external forces and internal CFSI/SET engagement 
tactics that allow the CFSI member OEMs to engage deeply in their supply chains, beyond the 
visible horizon; the mechanisms of deep supply chain engagement used by downstream OEMs to 
connect with upstream producers and their effectiveness; and the practices through which OEMs 
work together in the CFSI to engage suppliers. 
 
Through the analysis of timeline and qualitative data, sourced from the CFSI Smelter Database 
and semi-structured interview results respectively, this thesis presented a number of key findings. 
Firstly, key external forces and internal SET tactics were mapped onto timelines that show the 
supplier participation in the CFSP. This research speaks to the effectiveness of legislation, as 
creation of and compliance to the U.S. 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC reporting 
requirements were determined as being key factors driving the industry collaboration and deep 
supplier engagement, unique to the CFSI, as well as the success in achieving significant tantalum 
and tin supplier participation in the CFSP.  The development of the SETs was the most identified 
internal mechanisms of deep supplier engagement. This research identified that the barriers to 
overcome in SSCM include Liability of foreignness, Unique industry considerations, and 
determining SC visibility. These findings provided new insights to the understanding and 
practical applications of SSCM, and were presented in a summary of deep supplier engagement 
tactics and through a revised model of sustainable mineral supply chain management. 
Additionally, this research identified that social responsibility and SSCM are perceived to be 
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separate from environmental pro-activity and triple bottom line, and are not widely discussed as 
part of CSR and sustainability. Potential factors contributing to the difference between 
environmental and social sustainability initiatives were proposed.  
 
The extraction of conflict minerals contributes to the exploitation of people and abuse of human 
rights through forced labour, sexual violence, and armed conflict. By examining the 
effectiveness of the CFSI business collaboration to target deep supply chain sustainability and 
understanding the success and challenges related to the mechanisms of deep engagement 
undertaken by the SETs, this research raises awareness of the issue of conflict minerals and 
analyzes the industry’s efforts to address this issue. It is reasonable to conclude that the CFSI 
(now known as the Responsible Minerals Initiative or the RMI) is a model of industry 
collaboration, despite competition, between key agents in a shared supply chain network.  
Through addressing the issue of conflict minerals as a sustainability initiative the CFSI furthers 
international sustainable development by contributing to the achievement of multiple Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), including Goal 1 No Poverty, Goal 8 Decent Work and Economic 
Growth, Goal 12 Responsible Consumption and Production, Goal 16 Peace, Justice and Strong 
Institutions, and Goal 17 Partnerships for the Goals (UN, 2017).	 	
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
1. Can you share the story of how this metal/regional group of smelters or refiners (SORs) 
became active participants in the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) program? 
2. What were the external factors that enabled these smelters to participate? 
3. What were the external factors that impeded these smelters to participate? 
4. What deep supplier engagement tactics did your SET (SET) try that worked in achieving 
SOR active status? Why? 
5. What did you try that did not work? Why? 
6. Do you have any comments or insights regarding the peaks and valleys on the graph? 
7. Do you have any comments or insights that I did not address?  
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Appendix B: Timelines of 3TG SOR Active Dates and Participation in the 
CFSP 
 
 
Timeline of 3TG Smelter or Refiner Active Dates 
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Timeline of Tin Smelter or Refiner Active Dates 
 
Timeline of Tin Smelter or Refiner Participation in the CFSP  
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Timeline of Tantalum Smelter or Refiner Active Dates 
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Timeline of Tungsten Smelter or Refiner Active Dates 
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Timeline of Gold Smelter or Refiner Active Dates 
 
Timeline of Gold Refiner Participation in the CFSP 
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